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I. INTRODUCTION 
There is an interesting paradox in Schnitzler’s 1924 novella Fräulein Else: the author 
is the male doctor but the narrator and focalizor is the female ‘patient’ and this strategy 
is used in order to give speech to the voice that would normally have been silenced. 
Therefore, Schnitzler is implicitly taking part in Freud’s endeavour to 'give voice' to the 
'hysteric'. Freud explicitly refrences Schnitzler’s literary works and expresses his 
admiration for the writer's understanding of psychanalysis in Bruchstücke einer 
Hysterie-Analyse (1905). Many scholars have read Schnitzler's novella Fräulein Else 
as a response to Freud's theories, comparing their analysees of hysteria and drawing 
conclusions about their respective ideas about the aeteology of hysteria. However, there 
are more parallels between the two doctors apart from biographical and thematic 
connections, namely the ideological foundation of their respective projects of 'giving 
voice' to the 'hysteric'. This concept of ‘giving voice’ is in itself problematic, for it 
depends on representational politics without questioning them. Thus it is crucial to look 
at a literary text as communicative medium that not only narrates a story but also has 
an impact on the mind of the reader, informing her of someone else’s thoughts and 
ideas. As such, literature often has defined or reflected and dismantled how the ‘Other’ 
is constructed through the cultural production of meaning. Here, the ethical problem of 
writing itself, a writing that always includes representation, is my main focus. My main 
question is caught up in a quadrangle of issues - agency, speaking, silence and 
representation (in the sense of ‘darstellen’): “What does it matter who’s speaking” 
(Beckett) and who is actually speaking here, whose voice is this? For whom is that 
voice speaking? Why? In what way does silence speak – and what does this re-
presentation of speaking and silence do? In order to fully understand the meaning of 
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speaking for someone else, giving voice to someone else, I will draw on Mieke Bal’s 
Narratology, Michel Foucault’s What is an Author? and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s 
Can the Subaltern Speak?. 
 Through an engagement with these theoretical endeavours I will show that the 
texts by Schnitzler and Freud present us with questionable reliabilities. However, if 
their reliabilites are potentially compromised, then so are their representational politics. 
This shows their internalised, and problematic, assumption that representation is a 
necessary (and, especially for Freud, neutral) tool for understanding the ‘Other’. To 
find an alternative to this conceptualisation, I will turn to a contemporary South Korean 
novel by Han Kang, The Vegetarian (2007, English translation 2015). The main 
contrast, which can be drawn between those texts, lies in the narrative structure. Else’s 
interior monologue emphasises her point of view as a powerful tool the author uses in 
order to take his male point of view out of the equation. Freud, on the other hand, 
presents Dora through the lense of his own psychoanalytical interpretation. Similarly 
to Freud’s text and in contrast to Schnitzler’s interior monologue, the protagonist’s 
point of view in the novel, a young woman named Yeong-hye, is almost entirely effaced 
from the narrative. Yet, despite the protagonist’s absence, the novel creates an 
atmosphere of complicity between (implied) author, main character and reader. 
Thematically, both The Vegetarian and Fräulein Else try to understand and demonstrate 
the diverse mechanisms of the systematic silencing of women, even though they 
implement completely different literary techniques in order to do so. Whereas 
Schnitzler is still more invested in representational politics (i.e. speaking out for the 
‘Other’), I propose that The Vegetarian offers a different perspective on our 
apprehension of understanding and communication that does neither rely on verbal 
communication nor on representational politics. Instead, it allows for a new 
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conceptualisation of understanding and communication based on the idea that 
understanding of the ‘Other’ necessarily involves a new understanding of oneself. 
Contrarily to the Western philosophical concept of the autonomous self that 
comprehends the world objectively, The Vegetarian suggests that it is only in relation 
to the ‘Other’ that one can understand oneself, and that it is only through a genuine 
desire to understand the ‘Other’ that one can truly comprehend one’s own identity and 
social situatedness. 
 I will begin my analysis with a discussion of Schnitzler’s Fräulein Else and the 
question of reliability in that novella. Although many articles have been written on this 
novella, reliability has (to my knowledge) not been properly investigated, even though 
it is crucial to determine the (un-)reliability of Else as narrator and focalizor, since the 
structure of the interior monologue itself presents the narrative as subjective experience 
and can thus easily be interpreted as unreliable. Most analyses have described her 
decision-making process in terms of madness or mental illness without even addressing 
the question of reliability. Through a detailed examination of the text, I will show that 
Else is indeed a reliable narrator, which directly contradicts interpretations that have 
described her decision-making process as ‘delirious’ (i.e. as her going crazy) – an 
interpretation that I do not want to endorse.  Furthermore it is not only Else’s reliability 
that is at stake, but also the author’s. Since the novella is an attempt at speaking for 
someone who has been silenced, whilst pretending to be speaking from their subject 
position, it is important to scrutinise how this artificially constructed ‘subaltern’1 voice 
is presented and what effect that has on the reader. In order to discuss these questions I 
will draw on Mieke Bal’s narratology and other narratological examinations of what 
                                                 
1 Since Else pertains to the bourgeois, she is not really a subaltern, I will nontheless use the term here 
under a slightly different meaning: ‘subaltern’ in this text will be used in order to describe those who do 
not have any real ‘voice’ in society and whose point of view is silenced. 
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reliability and trustworthiness mean. Additionally, I will take recourse to theoretical 
texts by Michel Foucault (“What is an Author?”) and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak 
(“Can the Subaltern speak?”) to discuss what it means that this ‘female patient’ 
narrative was actually written by a male doctor. And finally, I will contrast the 
representational strategy used by Schnitzler with Freud’s representation of Ida Bauer. 
Through an analysis of Freud’s (un-)reliability I will argue that the text, even though 
Freud’s medical assessment of his patient is perfectly coherent, and indeed, is presented 
in such a way as to be as convincing as possible, Dora’s silence indirectly undermines 
and dismantles Freud’s carefully crafted analysis. 
 In the second part of my analysis I will focus on two chapters of Han’s The 
Vegetarian that contrasts both with Schnitzler’s and Freud’s texts. The first chapter 
“The Vegetarian” contrasts with Schnitzler’s novella because it represents the 
protagonist through eight segments in italics, which function as an interior monologue, 
albeit in an unconnected and elusive way. The primary narrator and focalizor of this 
chapter is the protagonist’s husband, and thus the narrative functions in a similar way 
to Freud’s analysis of Ida Bauer because the narrator/focalizor is crafted in such a way 
as to be contradicted by the silence of the protagonist, which is represented through the 
segments in italics. Thus, while my interpretation of Freud as an unreliable analyst 
might rely on my personal disagreement with Freud’s theoretical ideas, in the novel, 
the complicity with the protagonist is carefully constructed through the narrative 
structure. This shows the deliberate usage of represented silence in this narrative, in 
order to guide the readers’ emotional response to the narrative. The other chapter 
examined in this essay is the third one, “Flaming Trees”. This chapter is narrated by 
Yeong-hye’s sister, In-hye, and it envisions a completely new strategy of understanding 
and communication. The protagonist is no longer represented through segments in 
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italics and is only quoted in conversations. Furthermore, In-hye’s comprehension of her 
sister, which begins to unfold in this chapter, is not even rooted in (verbal) 
communication. Instead, understanding is seen to function through the desire to 
understand, through empathy and through a long history of a close personal 
relationship. As In-hye remembers scenes from their past lives together, she remembers 
her own problems and traumatic experiences, which enable her to start comprehending, 
not only her sister but also herself, in a completely new way.  
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II. ARTHUR SCHNITZLER’S FRÄULEIN ELSE 
USURPER OR SPEAKING FOR SOMEONE ELSE? 
 
Schnitzler’s novella Fräulein Else (1924) has inspired many interpretations without the 
problem of (un-)reliability being raised. Due to the fact that the interior monologue is a 
very peculiar narrative style that represents the world very subjectively, the question 
about the (un-)reliability of the narration is of consequence. There are two issues that 
are of importance: First of all, it is necessary to include a narratological discussion of 
(un-)reliability and its meaning in connection to this text and secondly, it needs to be 
taken into account that many of the interpretations of this novella are, in fact, implicitly 
based on the evaluation of the main character, Else, as an unreliable narrator, at least in 
some aspects. This is problematic, for it implicitly establishes a connection between the 
character and ‘hysteria’. These designations of unreliability are closely connected to 
the interpreter’s ideas about the concept of consciousness and how that consciousness 
should (or can) be expressed through language. In this essay I argue that Else is a 
reliable narrator and I analyse how this problem of assigned (un-)reliability is repeated 
in the relationship between male doctor/female patient and male author/female 
protagonist. Furthermore it will be helpful to examine the reaction of Else’s aunt (who 
represents female hostility on the one hand and social rules and etiquette on the other), 
since she interprets Else as ‘hysteric’. In this analysis I am not so much concerned with 
the question of whether Schnitzler tried to construct a counter narrative to Freud’s 
psychoanalytical case studies or whether Else’s story is influenced by the Dora-case. 
Instead, my focus is the nature of the narrative voice that depicts, i.e. re-presents 
[darstellen] a character and the implications of that narrative for questions of (un-
)reliability on the one hand, and on the other hand, I will explore the meaning that the 
re-presentative action (the narrative seen as action) creates and how specific 
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articulations of re-presentative action will influence how that narrative artificially 
constructs the re-presented. Through a connection to the narrative structure of the text 
and its link to Freud’s Dora-case, we gain insight into the constructedness of the 
narration as ‘immediate’ depiction of an experiencing consciousness, its cultural 
meaning and its critical depiction of the social mechanisms that silence women. 
 
2.1. Consciousness, (Un-)Reliability and the Mechanism of Silence 
2.1.1. Creativity and Consciousness 
The literary style of interior monologue presents the world filtered through the 
consciousness of an experiencing subject and is thus inherently inscribed with, at least, 
a questionable reliability. Instead of analysing this thoroughly, many interpreters of 
Schnitzler’s Fräulein Else have neglected this important aspect of the novella. When 
attention has been drawn to the composition of the narrative, interpreters have focused 
on the intermediality of the text that consists of excerpts of the music sheets for Robert 
Schumann’s Carnaval, most of which focus on the meaning of Schuman’s music as an 
interpretive tool.2 But analysing music sheets in a literary text only for “inhaltliche 
Spekulationen” (Gess, 155) does not take into account the complexity of two different 
media being interconnected in this text, as Nicola Gess suggests in her essay 
‘Intermediality Reconsidered’. She argues that the nature of the different media is 
important in order to understand the implications of the narrative structure.3 
                                                 
2 Cathy Raymond, for instance, argued that the music can be read symbolically for Else’s emotions and 
that the audience in the room listening to the pianist playing Schumann’s music is actually already 
confronted with Else’s feelings and thoughts through the music.  
3 „Else’s Bewußtsein ist in dem Moment von der Musik eingenommen, die sie gerade hört. Ähnlich wie 
zuvor die Dialoganteile anderer Personen, die kursiv in den Text eingelassen sind, ist so auch die Musik 
als Notenzitat im Text präsent. Zum anderen ist der Innere Monolog aber auch Musik, und zwar nicht 
nur, weil Musik um 1900 gern als Stimme des Unbewußten verstanden wurde, sondern vor allem, weil 
der Innere Monolog Strukturen übernimmt und transformiert, die von Schnitzler’s Zeitgenossen mit einer 
bestimmten Form von Musik assoziiert wurde.“ (Gess, 158f.). 
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Specifically, she points out the connection of ‘Freie Fantasie’ and ‘Innerer Monolog’. 
As Gess explains the origin of ‘Freie Fantasie’ and describes how it was received in 
society, an interesting dualism emerges: On the one hand we find creativity, 
ingeniousness and on the other hand the expression of madness (see 161). This very 
same dualism was also used in biographical descriptions of the musicians. She 
exemplifies this in the case of Schumann who was portrayed as “schizophrener 
Künstler” (153) whose compositions were influenced by his mental disorder (see ibid.). 
 This dualism creativity and insanity can be traced back to how imagination 
(‘Einbildungskraft’) and the process of conscious perception were understood to 
operate.4 What is important for Gess is that both Freie Fantasie and Innerer Monolog 
originate from ideas that try to describe how the human consciousness works. For her, 
the music sheets within the literary text represent a radicalisation of the interior 
monologue because the interior monologue contains “eine besonders reiche, zugleich 
aber auch außergewöhnlich dichte semantische Besetzung […], weil er mehr sagt, als 
dem Sprecher bewußt ist.“ (166). But this intense content is very cryptic and therefore 
difficult to decode. Nevertheless, it is even more difficult, if not impossible, to 
semantically decode the meaning of instrumental music such as Freie Fantasie (see 
ibid.). In addition to this layering of cryptic messages, Gess notes that this 
representation of music does not represent the usual experience of music: instead of 
sound, or at least the description of sound, the music sheets are silent, just like a literary 
text and the articulation of dissent of the protagonist. Furthermore, both styles intend to 
represent [darstellen] (chaotic) expressions of free association and formlessness while 
                                                 
4 „Daß die Einbildungskraft ein dubioses Vermögen ist, welches ungezähmt durch den Verstand einen 
regellosen Fluß von Bildern erzeugt, an dem der Mensch wahnsinnig zu werden droht – so die 
Befürchtung etwa Kants – findet im Kompositionsstil der Freien Fantasie sein ambivalent beurteiltes 
Pendant.“ (Gess, 165). 
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the representation itself is being meticulously crafted. Thus any free association is 
carefully designed and thus a mere construct, which Gess described as “geformte 
Formlosigkeit” (164). Paradoxically, in order to represent chaos, this chaos needs to be 
constructed first and can thus, by definition, never be chaotic, or at least, the chaos is 
not ‘authentic’ but order presented in such a way as to seem chaotic. Thus, the phrasing 
that Schnitzler took ‘his male point of view out of the equation’ (see above) can be seen 
as a farce, for the ‘female’ point of view is only imagined by a male author and thus 
necessarily endowed with his ‘male’ point of view. Far from invoking any sort of 
essentialism, this serves to emphasise the constructedness of the narrative. Similarly, 
the depicted experiencing consciousness is an inauthentic experiencing consciousness 
precisely because it is artificially fabricated and crafted in such a way as to represent 
what the writing subject imagines an experiencing consciousness to be. In order to 
understand this constructed narrative that simulates unconstructedness and immediacy, 
I want to consider some narratological issues that will also be helpful in analysing the 
(un-)reliability of the narrator. 
 Although one could argue that this text is not actually a ‘narrated’ text because 
it does not ‘narrate’ but rather tries to depict an experiencing consciousness, it is still 
an intentionally fabricated narrative that tells a story. The text itself was still written by 
an author, an author who chose an associative style of writing that is mirrored in the 
display of Schumann’s Carnaval and who chose to narrate this story from the point of 
view of a young girl, elaborating the text as a narration of her consciousness. Thus, it 
has been the endeavour of, for instance, Dorrit Cohn, to investigate several texts that 
depict a consciousness and to outline specific narrative elements that distinguish these 
texts from one another. She describes Fräulein Else in her book Transparent Minds as 
autonomous monologue but insists that the literary text has technical flaws in the 
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representation of a coherently depicted experiencing consciousness. She compares the 
music sheets to those printed in Dujardin’s Les Lauriers sont coupés (1887) and 
concludes that the music sheets were “more elaborately and perhaps less efficiently 
used by Schnitzler” (235f.). She argues that “it is difficult to accept this score simply 
as a quotation of her [Else’s] consciousness; it appears more like an authorial collage 
that draws attention to the behind-the-scenes ‘production’ of the text we are reading.” 
(236). But where Cohn detects a stylistic flaw, Gess reads the simultaneous expression 
that the music is in fact a part of Else’s consciousness and that it is a valuable 
interpretative insight that the irritating music sheets draw attention to the mode of 
writing. 
 Cohn’s second objection to Schnitzler’s use of the autonomous monologue is 
that the monologist “record[s her] own bodily movements” (ibid.), meaning that the 
autonomous monologue should be simulating the point of view of an experiencing self 
directly, i.e. without any form of mediation. For her, there must not be any kind of 
reference to anything that is obvious for the experiencing self and therefore she 
describes the following scene as ‘grotesque’ (ibid.): “Ich bewege die Hand, ich rege die 
Finger, ich strecke den Arm, ich sperre die Augen weit auf. Ich sehe, ich sehe. Da steht 
mein Glas.”5 (Schnitzler, 378). Of course, in Cohn’s definition of the writing style as 
‚autonomous monologue’ it is presupposed that this would be some kind of verbalised 
representation of consciousness. Although Cohn’s theorising has its validity and is 
certainly helpful, there is one aspect that needs to be examined very closely: Does 
Schnitzler’s text only try to represent verbalised thought, that is, should we presuppose 
that every sentence that is using “first-person pronouns combined with present action 
verbs” (236), as Cohn puts it, is a sentence Else verbally thinks? To explore how we 
                                                 
5 Cohn quotes this segment in English. 
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understand consciousness in the first place, let me turn to William James’ Principles of 
Psychology (1890) to further elaborate on what we mean when we talk about 
‘consciousness’. To understand how we conceptualise consciousness is also crucial for 
an understanding of Else’s (un-)reliability, since (un-)reliability is often indirectly 
ascribed by way of describing the depicted consciousness as ‘incoherence’. 
 Gess draws on William James in order to describe the explicit relationship 
between consciousness and the interior monologue: “die Inhalte des Bewußtseins 
[haben] die Form eines unaufhörlich fließenden Stroms vager Bilder” (165), and she 
claims that the interior monologue features as an artistic pendant to James’ more 
philosophical explanation (see 165f.). James dedicated an entire chapter in his 
Principles of Psychology to what he called ‘the stream of consciousness,’ and explores 
a variety of questions related to human consciousness. James’ analysis is more thorough 
than I can outline here, which is why I will only discuss some points of his argument 
that are especially relevant for the question of what an articulation of an experiencing 
counsciousness could look like: Firstly, instead of being stable, consciousness is always 
in motion and never stands still, or as James formulates it: “There are facts which make 
us believe that our sensibility is altering all the time, so that the same object cannot 
easily give us the same sensation over again.” (232); and: “Experience is remoulding 
us every moment, and our mental reaction on every given thing is really a resultant of 
our experience of the whole world up to that date.” (234). The importance of this is 
quite obvious for the interior monologue or stream of consciousness6: To describe an 
                                                 
6 I will use those two terms interchangeably. Both describe a literary style that represents an experiencing 
consciousness. Even though there is quite some difference in style between Penelope (Joyce, 1922) and 
Fräulein Else both texts ultimately do refer to their bodily movements or bodily experience. A 
consciousness never exists without also being aware of its body and of everything it perceives. I would 
rather argue that it is then a decision of style (and maybe of focus of attention) that leads an author to 
depict a fictional consciousness without giving an account of visual perception and sensory sensibility 
(bodily movements etc.) Nevertheless it can be helpful  to draw attention to this difference in style. 
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experiencing self, i.e. a consciousness in its process of continuous sensual, visual, 
emotional and intellectual momentary experiencing of life, the narration, logically, does 
not take the reader into account. The text is not designed to give full explanation but to 
portray the process of a consciousness that experiences and changes according to new 
thoughts and ideas or new appertained knowledge and that also changes due to sensorial 
perceptions or emotional reactions to others. Thus it is helpful to examine how the 
reader’s interpretation of an interior monologue is described in relation to the 
narrating/focalising consciousness. Interestingly, the relation between Else’s 
consciousness and the reader’s interpretation has been described like this: “While she 
remains unable to construct a coherent and transparent narrative of meaning, the reader 
is able to put all the pieces of Else’s interior monologue together.” (Huyssen, 42). 
Although it might be true that the reader is capable of analysing the novella in a sensible 
manner, Else’s consciousness is far from being incoherent. The mere fact that it is 
extremely easy for the reader to follow all her strains of thought, to feel empathy 
towards her and to understand her behaviour underlines the coherence of the narrative. 
This is also true if we consider the development of Else’s thoughts and her reasoning 
(i.e. the way in which she in fact does ‘construct a coherent and transparent narrative 
of meaning’). Even if everything that is transmitted to the reader in a verbalised manner 
does occur in Else’s consciousness without the actual ‘utterance’ of those words, her 
manner of reasoning is still absolutely coherent. Even granting that Else’s development 
of thought does not follow a strict logical course and that her opinion about certain 
matters constantly changes, it needs to be recognised that this is precisely how a 
consciousness would be developing a coherent narrative of meaning. James quotes Mr. 
Shadworth Hodgons who wrote “What I find when I look at consciousness […] is a 
sequence of different feelings.” (230), and concluded that “Every thought we have of a 
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given fact is, strictly speaking, unique, and only bears a resemblance of kind with our 
other thoughts of the same fact. […] Often we are ourselves struck at the strange 
differences in our successive views of the same thing.” (233). This is exactly what 
happens to Else. She constantly revises her opinion about whether she should sacrifice 
herself for her father and her opinion changes according to spontaneous fellings and 
thoughts, e.g. the thought that her father knew exactly what Dorsday would ask of her 
enrages her and in this light it is only logical for her to argue that her father deserves to 
be in prison. However, once she realises that everything in her life, even her status in 
society, depends on her father’s wealth and reputation and that both she and her mother 
would be poor and outcast by society if he would be imprisoned, she begins to 
understand her situation in a completely new way. Insinuating that Else is incapable of 
constructing a ‘coherent and transparent narrative of meaning’ (Huyssen qtd. above) 
simply shows that this interpreter was incapable of accepting this young woman as an 
intelligent observer and interpreter of her situation and of giving her the credit she 
deserves and thus exposes his own gender-biased view. This labelling of Else’s 
narrative as ‘incoherent’ will be important later on in the context of (un-)reliability. 
 Having discussed how to deal with coherence in such a narrative, I want to 
explore a second important point of James’ discussion of consciousness: the question 
whether our thoughts always appear in our minds in the form of language or not. James 
draws on the writings of “Mr. Ballard, a deaf-mute instructor in the National College at 
Washington” (266) in order to declare that thought need not only function through 
language. He does not directly state whether he thinks this to be the case for all people 
or merely deaf-mute ones, but I believe it to be implied that this should be accepted as 
a strong argument for nonverbal forms of thought. This non-articulate thought, then, 
does pose quite an intricate dilemma for the literary style of interior monologue. For, if 
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we suppose that there are parts of our consciousness that are verbally inaccessible and 
therefore beyond verbal articulation, this also means that if literature depicts an 
experiencing consciousness it would need to somehow still express what is impossible 
to articulate, i.e. verbally inaccessible. In this sense, Schnitzler did not try to depict 
what Cohn calls an ‘autonomous monologue,’ and indeed to insist that writers conform 
to narratological classification is absurd in itself and thus the devaluation of any style 
of narrative due to a technical flaw seems ridiculous. Furthermore, Cohn’s argument 
that to mention ‘bodily movements’ interferes with the coherence of an autonomous 
monologue would be based on the assumption that this type of monologue should only 
depict what is verbally expressible. Instead, I want to argue that Schnitzler’s novella 
depicts more than mere verbal articulation of the consciousness because it also tries to 
express parts of Else’s consciousness that are located outside of the possiblity of 
articulation, which is also hinted at through the implementation of music sheets that 
dismiss verbal thought altogether. Obviously, in a medium that is very much based on 
the possibility of verbalised expression of thought and experience, it is difficult to 
portray those parts of the consciousness that cannot even be verbally accessed. 
Additionally, we need to take into account that the experiencing consciousness might 
not always be aware of the full meaning of her/his actions. This does not mean that this 
narrative needs be incoherent, but it does give rise to the question of (un-)reliability in 
the narrative text. 
 
2.1.2. Determining (Un-)Reliability 
In order to address the question of (un-)reliability in Fräulein Else it will be productive 
to incorporate some basic narratological terminologies. Whereas a literary text has 
mostly been divided into discourse and story, Mieke Bal argued that there is, in fact, 
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another level that one needs to take into account when talking about a narrative: the 
text. According to Bal, the text is a medium or material that consists of signs. The nature 
of these signs will depend on the nature of the medium, for instance written word, film 
or picture (see 5). The text of Schnitzler’s novella consists of written word, written word 
in quotation marks and in italics, but, and this is interesting, the music sheets would 
also be part of the text, thus confirming Gess’ analysis and her argument that the music 
sheets are part of Else’s consciousness. In Bal’s terminology the story refers to what 
others call the discourse, and the fabula corresponds to the story. In order not to 
overcomplicate this terminology, I only focus on Bal’s concepts without pointing out 
specific differences and divergences between her terms and those of other narratologists 
(e.g. Genette). I chose to implement Bal’s terminology because the additional element 
of text allows us to understand the narrative in a more complex way, for it incorporates 
the visuality of the text and thus helps our understanding of the narratological structure. 
It is important to notice, however, that, for Bal, these terminologies are merely 
theoretically distinguishable subdivisions, which account for the complexity of any 
narrative and its interaction with the reader.  
 I will begin by outlining Bal’s definition of the fabula. According to her “A 
fabula is a series of logically and chronologically related events that are caused or 
experienced by actors” (ibid.). This concept of the fabula does not envision an objective 
storyline that underlies the story, but rather that the recombination of the events into a 
coherent structure of time and logic depends on the reader’s interpretation of the story, 
the reader being influenced both by the “initial encounter with the text and by the 
manipulations of the story” (9).  Here, Bal addresses already two major problems of 
literary analysis – the reader is always influenced by the visual presentation of the text 
and manipulated by the way the story is told. Hence the importance of Bal’s 
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incorporation of the text as separate layer of the narrative, which is the element of the 
text which we first encounter. In distinction to the fabula which the reader herself 
fabricates, the story is everything that happens in-between the other two layers, “a story 
is a fabula that is presented in a certain manner” (5), including the choice of 
chronological or achronological presentation, point of view, colouring of the actors with 
definite character traits,7 and locations that are given specific characteristics (see 8). 
This is different from the layer of the text because the story can be transmitted using 
different signs and thus a different medium - language, image, sound, or a combination 
of these etc. -  changes the reader’s perception (see ibid.) 
 In oder to show the full significance of Bal’s differentiation, I want to exemplify 
this with Fräulein Else. As mentioned before, this text combines two different media: 
written word and written piano directions. Additionally, there are different styles of 
writing and indications of direct speech. What has not been discussed yet is another 
element of how the interior monologue is visualised: The story’s style of writing is 
visually accessible through its unusual punctuation (‘-‘ ‘- -‘ or ‘…’). Another issue is 
Schnitzler’s use of ‘incorrect’ grammatical spelling in his attempt to depict colloquial 
language.8 All these elements are part of the text. 
 The story, however, is the description of everything Else experiences, her 
feelings and thoughts and her dialogues with others. The characters in the story are 
exactly how Else describes and characterises them. In this way, the depiction of Cissy, 
for instance, is ambiguous. Throughout the narrative, Else seems to oscillate between 
esteem and mockery: “Warum sagt Cissy >Dinner<?9 Dumme Affektation.” (327); 
                                                 
7 The ‚actor‘ is in the fabula what the ‘character’ is in the story. 
8 He sometimes does use grammatically ‚correct’ abbreviations (e.g. wär’ for ‘wäre’), and sometimes 
grammatically ‘incorrect’ forms (e.g. wär). 
9 Here another element on the level of the text designates differences in pronunciation. 
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“Hat sie was an unter dem Schlafrock, wenn sie zu ihm kommt? Es ist schwer, wenn 
man in solchen Dingen nicht geübt ist. Soll ich sie um Rat fragen, die Cissy?“ (356). 
My use of the word ‘seems‘ already shows how troublesome it can be to clearly 
distinguish story and fabula, and it is essential to observe this closely. Here, the very 
style of narration makes this differentiation extremely delicate because Else never 
clearly defines her opinion of Cissy – of course not: the text, i.e. the narrating medium, 
is that of an experiencing self in the present moment and there is no reason why Else 
should clarify her meaning to herself. In this narrative style it is easier to first distinguish 
story and fabula on a broader scale: The story consists of a young girl, Else, who is on 
holidays with her aunt in a hotel with several other guests she knows. One day, she 
receives a letter from her mother, telling her about an unfortunate event that has fallen 
upon their family. Her father has illegally gambled with ward money and has to go to 
prison if he cannot pay his debt. Therefore, Else’s mother asks her daughter for help, 
saying she should persuade Dorsday, an old acquaintance of her father, to send her 
father the needed amount. Else tries to do so, but Dorsday wants something in return: 
to contemplate her nakedness for a quarter of an hour. Else does not want to do this and, 
after a very long process of decision-making, finally disrobes in public. She does this 
because she wants to cheat Dorsday without actually denying his request and thereby 
still forcing him to give her father the money. She falls into a state in which she can 
still hear and later on also see everything around her, but she cannot move. Once she is 
brought to her bedroom and everyone is in the hallway, she is able to move again and 
drinks a glass of veronal that she had put on the side of her bed before publicly 
displaying her naked body. She then drifts off, loses consciousness. This is the story. 
 Now, the fabula is constructed according to my own interpretation of this story. 
In order to argue that the fabula I have fashioned this way makes sense, I need to analyse 
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the texts closely and scrutinise whether certain details I detect are actually part of the 
story that is being narrated. In my case, the fabula runs like this: A young girl, Else, is 
being asked by her naïve mother to help out her father who is an irresponsible criminal 
who gambled with ward money. Else realises (and correctly so) that her father has 
foreseen what kind of service Dorsday would ask of her in return for the money and 
that her father is trying to abuse her daughterly feelings for him. Else rebels against this 
injustice but eventually has to accept that without the support of a financially stable 
male subject she has no place in this society. But rather than simply accepting this social 
condition and conforming to its conventions, she decides to defy every social rule that 
has been imposed on her: she denies Dorsday the pleasure of seeing her alone and she 
refuses to acquiesce to her father’s will that he might profit from her sacrifice without 
making sure the world knows that there has been a sacrifice. When she realises that the 
world will construct her as an hysteric instead of seeing the injustice done and 
recognising her sacrifice, she panics and drinks veronal in an attempt at suicide.10 Thee 
distinction between text, story and fabula will be a very helpful tool for discussing (un-
)reliability. 
 There have been quite a few discussions about (un-)reliability and its meaning 
for literary analysis and a recent collection of essays also addressed the issue in 
connection with doctor-patient relationships, politics and journalism: Unreliability and 
Trutsworthiness: Intermedial and Interdisciplinary Perspectives (2015). As Vera 
Nünning explains in the first chapter of this volume, cognitive narratology has argued 
that the concept of untrustworthiness is “used in order to reconcile and explain text-
                                                 
10 “ [Scheible] has clearly shown, the repeated exact amount of Veronal cited in the text can only serve 
the purpose of pointing to the fact that this amount of the popular sleeping pill is not enough to lead even 
to the danger of death, i.e., Else stages a suicide attempt, but will most certainly wake up after the end of 
the novella.” (Schmid-Bortenschlager, 515). 
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internal as well as -external discrepancies” (8). Of course, in most cases, if the narrator 
is unreliable that is because he/she/it was written as such. Nünning also argues that 
different designations of unreliability can point out what the difference between 
‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ consists of in a specific culture (see 14). In the context of 
Else’s explicit classification as ‘hysteric’ by society (Cissy says: “Ein hysterischer 
Anfall wird behauptet.” [Schnitzler, 378]) this is crucial, since 
“how unreliable narrators are dealt with allows one to recognise what is unreliable but tolerable 
and just within the limits of the acceptable, what is considered as scandalous and criticised, and 
what is mad or deceitful to such an extent that it is  deemed necessary to send the narrators to 
closed psychiatric wards or commit them to prison.” (Nünning, 14; my italics).  
First of all, Cissy’s phrasing ‘wird behauptet’ makes quite clear that she is of another 
opinion (without even quoting her explicitly saying this). That Cissy does believe that 
Else has had a hysterical seizure is thus part of the story. The interpreter could argue 
that Else only imagines this, after all one could argue that she is in a traumatic shock 
and thus the probability of her account of reality being unreliable has been increased. 
But this is not what I want to contend. Instead, it will be useful to consider this inherent 
connection that Nünning makes between analysed unreliability and patterns of social 
exclusion. Assigning unreliability positions the character as an outsider in society and 
since the style of interior monologue does suggest at least a questionable realibility it is 
essential to understand how and why this designation of unreliability comes about. The 
following discussion of (un-)reliability in doctor/patient relations, the differentiation 
between focalizor/narrator and some attempts to deal with narrative texts that are 
ambiguous concerning (un-)reliability will help analyse Schnitzler’s novella and, more 
importantly, the (un-)reliability of its main character, Else.  
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 The volume mentioned above features an article by Jarmila Mildorf titled 
“Unreliability in Patient Narratives: From Clinical Assessment to Narrative Practice”. 
In this essay she examines the relationship between doctors and their patients and the 
problem of basic doctor-patient communication, i.e. how does the doctor know whether 
his/her patient is an unreliable source of information? She starts by pointing out why 
this question is of importance – even in a doctor/patient relationship where one might 
be tempted to suppose that the patient relates his/her problem in a reliable manner. 
Mildorf detects several problems that might arise in doctor/patient communications. 
Firstly, a doctor might doubt the patient’s narrative because s/he believes that the 
patient is only pretending to be sick (see 395). Secondly, she argues that “reliability is 
also related to certain codes of conduct and practices that are adequate in a given social 
interaction” (396), meaning that the designation of unreliability might derive simply 
from a patient behaving in a non-normative way. Thirdly, she says that unreliability is 
also “closely connected to the ways in which people wish to present themselves in 
conversations” (ibid.). Although these points are all interesting and absolutely valid, 
her last argument is especially intriguing: “And finally, unreliability may depend 
strongly on what the doctor perceives as ‘unreliable’ in a given situation.” (397), This 
point also reflects back to her second observation: It is the doctor’s perception of 
‘unusual’ behaviour in the patient that will determine the doctor’s verdict. This, of 
course, will depend on the doctor’s assumptions of normative, i.e. ‘normal’ behaviour. 
Obviously, this is a very important point in Mildorf’s entire discussion, for she stresses 
this several times (see 399, 409) in order to argue that a major problem in the 
doctor/patient relationship is that the patient’s narrative is not taken seriously enough 
and that the doctors should focus more on how their patients narrate (see e.g. 406). She 
adds that doctors need to be aware “of their own biases” (408) that contribute to the 
27 
unreliability of the patient’s narrative.11 She clearly wishes to accentuate, however, the 
potential danger of too readily adopting a “benevolent image of the patient” (405) which 
would lead to an ignorance of the real problems that a patient’s “malingering or 
deception [can pose to] doctors and to society” (see ibid.). Interestingly, Mildorf does 
connect these issues to literary analysis and narratology, albeit only in a footnote: 
“whether a story is perceived as reliable or unreliable, [Christoph] Bode argues, 
depends on how readers read the text and on whether they begin to feel suspicious about 
what they are told.” (398). This shows firstly, that narrative analysis is always 
important, whatever kind of narration might be the focus of examination, and secondly, 
that the discussion of (un-)reliability does not need to deal with the style of the narrative 
but also with the question why an interpreter designates a certain style of narration or a 
specific character as unreliable. 
 It is very intriguing that through the analysis of (un-)reliability several attempts 
have been made to deal with the problem of ambiguity – whether by distinguishing 
several kinds of unreliabilities (e.g. irony as narratological tool to undermine the 
focalizor’s point of view or by drawing on the Possible-Worlds Theory that states that 
conflicting points of view do not mean that one point of view needs to be described as 
‘false’. The problematic issue with this theory is that it legitimises every point of view, 
and if everything is possible, who gets to decide what reality is? Nevertheless, these 
theoretical frameworks can help distinguish different types of unreliability. Robert 
Vogt’s attempt to connect the Possible-Worlds Theory to cognitive science in order to 
make his theory valuable for interpretation is interesting, because even though 
                                                 
11 Dana Crowley Jack writes in Silencing the Self. Women and Depression about how theories of 
depression have often not acknowledged that women experience depression for other reasons than 
men do and thus need to be treated differently. She also accentuates that women have often been 
taught to not talk about their own needs because they are perceived as invalid (see chapter 1 “Prepare 
to Listen”). 
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unreliability is something that is ascribed rather than an inherent feature, a false 
description, e.g. ascribing someone a specific role, of reality still exists and that needs 
to be analysed in its full philosophical depth. Thus, Vogt’s premise firstly, that a reader 
is able to differentiate between narrator and focalizor etc. (see 144), and secondly, that 
the reader can analyse the narrative and interpret it (see 148) is vital, for it ascribes a 
basic ability to analyse to every reader. This distinction between narrator and focalizor 
can be paralleled with the reader’s ability to distinguish between text and story and its 
importance for defining the (un)-reliability of a fictional character. 
 The reliability of Else in Schnitzler’s novella is certainly questionable, and not 
only due to its composition as interior monologue. The style Schnitzler uses guarantees 
the reader a direct, i.e. umediated, migration or insight into Else’s consciousness. 
Nevertheless, this warranty only exists on the surface of the narrative text. Once the 
reader realises that this professed unmediated migration into the mind of another is in 
fact only a textual construction, or a convention of a literary subgenre, the illusion is 
disrupted. This reiterates the point Gess made that I quoted above: The highly artificial 
construction of a supposedly chaotic unconstructedness. Thus, there are already two 
issues that call the reliability of the novella into question – Else, of course, interprets 
everything that happens according to her own, very subjective, perception of her own 
feelings and likewise interprets the behaviour of others in relation to her personal 
apperception of social codes and their meanings. The second issue relates to the 
theoretical difference that can be made explicitly between text and story. While the 
story is formulated by the focalizor12, the text, however, is the layer at which Bal situates 
                                                 
12 For Bal, the focalizor is “an aspect of the story [the] narrator tells. It is the represented ‘colouring’ of 
the fabula by a specific agent of perception, the holder of the ‘point of view’.” (19). 
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the narrator13. This is an absolutely crucial distinction and designates that there is a 
narrator that is neither identical with the author (or the implied author), nor identical 
with the focalizor (which in this specific case would be Else). In terms of (un-
)reliability, this means that Bal’s distinction brings a valuable point into the discussion. 
In describing Else’s narrative as incoherent, one misses the point that Else actually does 
not narrate at all. She is the focalizor in this narrative text and is therefore a character 
in the story. The textual (linguistic) signs that constitute the text, however, are narrated 
by the narrator, an agent that (at least in this sense) technically doesn’t exist on the level 
of the story, because it only refers to the text-layer of the narrative. In this case, the 
narrator is, due to the chosen style of writing and the chosen point of view, almost 
imperceptible. Here, the narrator only appears as a transmitter of signs and can be 
detected best by the elements of the text, i.e. the usage of italics, but also through a 
discussion of (un-)reliability. This distinction needs to be made because the focalizor 
in the story, the experiencing subject, would not need to textually distinguish (i.e. using 
italics) between who is speaking. These are signs that are not part of the experiencing 
consciousness, thus the need to theoretically distinguish between focalizor and narrator 
and the need for or the choice of the narrator to make these differences visible in the 
text. An experiencing consciousness is the focalizor, but the depiction of that 
consciousness is still a mediation and therefore needs to be ‘narrated’. Therefore, even 
in an interior monologue a narrator is required. Apart from that, the discussion of (un-
)reliability can establish that if the narrator weren’t a neutral transmitter of signs then 
the conflict between the focalizor’s point of view and the world would not be 
undistinguishable, that is, there would be an obvious disparity between the focalizor’s 
                                                 
13 For Barl, the narrator is “that agent which utters the linguistic signs which constitute the text” (18). It 
does not correspond to the idea of the ‘implied author’. 
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interpretation and the interpretation the reader makes of this narrative according to the 
narrator’s influence.  
 Having seen the full extent of political, medical and literary implications of (un-
)reliability, I want to address the above discussed ‘incoherence’ interpreters have seen 
in Else’s ‘narrative,’ because arguing that her perception of reality is incoherent 
undermines her as a reliable source of information. As I have outlined already, she does 
not narrate in an incoherent manner. Furthermore, she actually does not narrate at all, 
but is the focalizing character in the story. In this context it is of great importance that 
Schnitzler chose to depict Else’s situation in the form of an interior monologue. One 
would suppose that this narrative style would incline all readers towards an 
interpretation that is in favour of Else’s rationality and sensibility but contrarily to this 
conjecture there have been various interpretations that have argued either for the 
incoherence of Else’s thoughts, and accordingly for her unreasonableness or else for 
her being brave by defying the world and losing her mind due to the disturbing 
experience that her defiance exposes her to. Interestingly, even differentiated (feminist) 
readings describe the scene leading to Else’s disrobing as an “increasing delirium” (see 
Elizabeth Goodstein, 220), or her disrobing as an artistic expression of her 
exhibitionism (see Kelly Comfort, 202-204) and it needs to be noted that while 
Goodstein’s phrasing is far from unconnected to a possible designation of Else as ‘going 
mad’ or as being a ‘hysteric,’ Comfort’s analysis does not differentiate between Else’s 
desire of being seen by a man she desires and the circumstances that force her to 
publicly disrobe. These designations inherently undermine Else’s point of view as valid 
and thus can be aligned with other issues of ‘victim-blaming’. 
 In the next section I want to cross-analyse Schnitzler’s narrative with two other 
texts and thereby show how the differentiation between narrator and focalizor can be a 
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tool for determining (un-)reliability. I will include a discussion of the feminist reception 
of Freud’s Bruchstücke einer Hysterie-Analyse (1905), and a short excursus that 
contrasts Else as narrator/focalizor with Edouard Dujardin’s narrator/focalizor Daniel 
in Les Lauriers sont coupés (1887). This will showcase how unreliability can be 
implemented on the level of the text (i.e. the narrator) in order to undermine the 
focalizor. These discussions will portray the analytical importance of properly 
distinguishing between (socially) ascribed unreliability (see Vera Nünning above) and 
real unreliability in doctor/patient narratives (see Mildorf above). This will shed light 
on many important questions14, which I will outline first, drawing on Spivak, Foucault 
and Beckett: 
 
2.2. What matter who’s speaking? 
2.2.1. Theory First: Spivak, Foucault & Beckett 
In a literary text there are always multiple voices at work, however, if one wants to 
answer the question of whose voices those voices are, one must inevitably take a look 
at the figure of the author. Although I do not argue that the author should be interpreted 
as an independent, sovereign Subject who is the sole creator of the literary universe, the 
figure of the author should not be disposed of too lightly. I view the author as a subject 
immersed in life, culture, education, personal belief, biological predisposition, etc. who 
will not act independently of any of these influences. Despite this, it would be wrong 
to completely negate the agency of the author, since the author is still the one who 
actively decides what sort of story to write and whether to include social, political or 
                                                 
14 Who is ascribing unreliability to whom? Who is speaking for whom? What does it matter who’s 
speaking? And whose voice is it anyway? (see introduction). 
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ethical questions in her writings. This agency will often involve a personal ethics that 
drives the author to such a choice. In the following I will consider Gayatri Chakravorty 
Spivak’s question Can the Subaltern speak?, with a focus on her criticism of 
eurocentrism in Foucualt and Deleuze and her differentiation between representation 
[vertreten] and re-presentation [darstellen]. Since writing a story inevitably involves 
some sort of representation Spivak’s critique draws attention to the political importance 
of nuanced re-presentation and will make visible the power dynamics that are inherent 
in representational politics.  
 Her canonical essay was first published in 1988 and has since been revised for 
her book A Critique of Postcolonial Reason (1999) and revisited again in 2010 in her 
article “In Response. Looking Back, Looking Forward.”15 As she accounts in the last, 
the driving force was not only the question of ‘Can the subaltern speak?,’ but also “who 
hears the subaltern?” (229). Another point of importance in Spivak’s analysis is the idea 
of reading or seeing “death as text” (235). In her response she emphasises her personal 
role, her own involvement as educator, as teacher on the one hand and as an intellectual 
listener/reader of the subaltern. She argues that in order to challenge the designations 
of subalternity, there needs to be a crisis in the subaltern’s conception of herself, i.e. 
there needs be a challenge to the status quo of the subaltern. This crack in the ideology 
that makes the subaltern reject their own conditions as ‘natural’ can happen in different 
ways. One is the task of the educator who listenes to the subaltern and shares a space 
with them, enabling the educator to teach the subaltern to perceive themselves 
differently, to question their own condition as ‘natural’ – “If this teaching is not 
                                                 
15 I quote all three texts from the same book: Can the Subaltern speak? Reflections on the History of an 
Idea, that emerged after a conference at Columbia University. The first version is printed as appendix 
(pp. 237-291); the version from A Critique of Postcolonial Reason constitues ‘Part One’ (pp. 21-78), and 
In Response ‘Part Five’ (pp. 227-236) of this volume. I will only quote the page numbers. 
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performed, subalterns remain in subalternity, unable to represent themselves and 
therefore needing to be represented.” (232). The other task is that of the intellectual to 
listen to and to read those subaltern subjects who are able to express their dissent, but 
cannot make their dissent heard in institutions that would give them any legal power. 
Similar to this is also the need for the intellectual to learn to “read situations where no 
response happens” (235). 
In addition to these, I want to emphasise the importance of education within the 
society of the oppressor.16 As a white European cis-woman, I am concerned with the 
question of how to become sensitive to my own biases, how to comprehend the ‘other’ 
on their own terms and how to dismantle the ideology of the Western subject who sees 
itself as the sole bearer of enlightenment, democracy, equality and human rights, 
without acknowledging their own manifold disavowals of those same values. Therefore 
I will first outline Spivak’s criticism of Foucault and Deleuze, her subsequent analysis 
of the difference between representing [vertreten, which has the connotation of 
‘standing in for’/’replacing’] and re-presenting [darstellen, which has the connotation 
of ‘depicting’], and then focus my analysis on two literary texts that can be read as re-
presenting a specific subaltern subject. I will argue that this Darstellung of the subaltern 
does, however, more than just re-present because the mode of re-presentation in these 
specific texts functions simultaneously as a speaking for the subaltern – not so much in 
that it would be a representation [Vertretung/Repräsentation] but in that it allows for an 
understanding of the re-presented based on the emotional connection established 
through the style of re-presentation. In arguing thus, I am not so much focusing on the 
question whether the subaltern can or cannot speak but rather on the implications of 
                                                 
16 Spivak does not address this distinctly although it seems to be implied in her notion of the teacher as 
counter-action. 
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someone else speaking for the subaltern by way of re-presentation. These implications 
are outlined in detail in Spivak’s essay.  
In the first part of her essay17, Spivak focuses on the voice of the Western 
intellectual who attempts to speak for the subaltern and she criticises both Foucault and 
Deleuze for their naïve transparency, arguing that “the two systematically ignore the 
question of ideology and their own implication in intellectual and economic history” 
(238). In ignoring the importance of ideology in the formation of their own knowledge 
and thinking, the two philosophers who have critiqued the idea of the sovereign subject 
implicity reinstate the idea of a sovereign subject in their conversation. In proposing 
that one only needs “to establish conditions where the prisoners themselves would be 
able to speak” (Foucault qtd. in ibid., 241), Foucault imagines that the subaltern are 
merely being silenced and not, as Spivak argues, simultaneously influenced by an 
ideology that legitimises the current conditions, an ideology in ‘native’ (or through 
colonisation established) patriarchal systems that makes the female subaltern doubly 
invisible. This importance of ideology in the construction of identity can be seen most 
clearly in Spivak’s conception of the educator as the person who enables the subaltern 
to question their own subalternity (see above). Without taking ideology into account, 
there cannot be a proper analysis of the contradictory consciousness of the subaltern – 
and of the intellectual. The main problem with the Western intellectual who does not 
reflect the construction of her own identity in terms of socio-economic and ideological 
influences obscures “that Western intellectual production is, in many ways, complicit 
with Western international economic interests.” (235). She continues: 
                                                 
17 I am using the earlier version of her essay, since Spivak kept all the elements of that essay that are of 
interest in this context unchanged in her revision in A Critique of Postcolonial Reason. 
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“Some of the most radical criticism coming out of the West today is the result of an interested 
desire to conserve the subject of the West, or the West as Subject. The theory of pluralized 
‘subject-effects’ gives an illusion of undetermining subjective sovereignty while often providing 
a cover for this subject of knowledge. Although the history of Europe as Subject is narrativized 
by the law, political economy, and ideology of the West, this concealed Subject pretends it has 
‘no geo-political determinations’.” (238). 
Her point is that unquestioned ideological assumptions of the Western intellectual lead 
to a reiteration of cultural biases, as can be seen in her analysis of the conversation 
between Foucault and Deleuze in “Intellectuals and Power: A Conversation between 
Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze.” Thus, when Foucault appropriates the term 
‘Maoist’ “for the eccentric phenomenon of French intellectual ‘Maoism’ [he] 
symptomatically renders ‘Asia’ transparent” (ibid.). This transparency is dangerous 
because it presupposes that the Western subject can silently disappear and ‘objectively’ 
represent the Other (in this case ‘Asia’). This, however, means that  
“The S/subject, curiously sewn together into a transparency by denegations, belongs to the 
exploiter’s side of the international division of labor. […] However reductionistic an economic 
analysis might seem, the French intellectuals forget at their peril that this entire overdetermined 
enterprise was in the interest of a dynamic economic situation requiring that interests, motives 
(desires), and power (of knowledge) be ruthlessly dislocated.” (248f.) 
 Spivak ‘s critique can be more clearly outlined with the concept of desire, 
especially present in Deleuze. His (and Foucault’s) misconception here is that they 
disallow for the subaltern to be incoherent, contradictory subjects and imagine them as 
sovereign subjects who desire only that which is in their best interests: “We never desire 
against our interest, because interest always follows and finds itself where desire has 
placed it” and “We must accept the scream of Reich: no, the masses were not deceived; 
at a particular moment, they actually desired a fascist regime” (Deleuze qtd. in ibid. 
241). However, this creates the illusion of an undivided subject and simultaneously 
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disallows for the influence of ideology in the production of subjectivity. Consequently 
Foucault and Deleuze see themselves as intellectuals who are capable of understanding 
‘the masses,’ including the subaltern and the oppressed, which leads Foucault to 
announce the project “to establish conditions where the prisoners themselves would be 
able to speak” (qtd. in ibid.). Spivak criticises this illusive transparency that acts more 
as a means through which the intellectual can present herself as transparent and thus 
capable of representing society’s Other (see 243) and accuses Foucault and Deleuze of 
being unaware  
“that the intellectual within socialized capital, brandishing concrete experience, can help 
consolidate the international division of labor [which can be seen in] the unrecognized 
contradiction within a position that valorizes the concrete experience of the oppressed while being 
so uncritical about the historical role of the intellectual” (242).  
She argues that this can be seen in Deleuze’s assumption “There is no more 
representation; there’s nothing but action,” “action of theory and action of practice” 
(qtd. ibid.), thereby ignoring the complexity of the very term ‘representation’. As 
Spivak points out, the term (both in French and English) eradicates the difference that 
can be seen in German. She draws on Marx to exemplify this. For my purposes it will 
suffice to outline the different connotations of the word ‘representation’ as made visible 
in German without talking about Marx specifically.  
 Spivak marks this difference in English through hyphenation: representation vs. 
re-presentation. I have kept this difference in the section above. She uses ‘represent’ as 
the equivalent of the German vertreten and re-present as darstellen. Vertreten has the 
connotation of ‘standing in for’ or ’replacing’ and could be also translated as 
‘substituting,’ while dartsellen has the connotation of ‘depicting’. As Spivak argues, 
this opposition can be traced back to a discussion about rhetoric being either tropology 
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or persuasion. Vertreten would fall in the category of persuasion and darstellen into 
that of tropology (244). Thus representing and re-presenting are conceptually 
completely different from each other. This difference is effaced in Deleuze’s statement 
quoted above. The idea that there is only action, in theory and in practice, means that 
there need not be a critique of ideology and that there need not be an education that 
counteracts ideological (deceived) consciousness: 
“The critique of ideological subject-constitution within state formation and systems of political 
economy can now [i.e. after Deleuze’s dictum ‘There is no representation’] be effaced, as can the 
active theoretical practice of the ‘transformation of consciousness.’ The banality of leftist 
intellectuals’ lists of self-knowing, politically canny subalterns stands revealed; representing 
them, the intellectuals represent themselves as transparent.” (243). 
 There are two points of importance here. Firstly, that Deleuze’s denegation of 
representation implies that the subaltern are not re-presented [as in darstellen], which 
is obviously wrong. And secondly, that despite that negation, the Western intellectual 
still pretends to be able to represent the ‘Other’. In the following I want to turntowards 
the idea of re-presentation [Darstellung], explicitly in the form of literature.  
 In literature re-presentation needs to be accounted for on several levels, as can 
be described with Bal’s terminology outlined above. The characters in the story are re-
presented by the focalizor and the focalizor is re-presented by the narrator, who is re-
presented by the (implied) author. Thus it is essential to ask Qu’est-ce qu’un auteur? 
(1969) as Foucault did. Even though specific aspects of Foucault’s writing are, as 
Spivak outlined, problematic, his observation of the power structures that define who 
is allowed to speak and who isn’t is valuable. 
 His point of departure in Qu’est-ce qu’un auteur? (1969) is a quote from Samuel 
Beckett’s Textes pour rien (1954): “Beckett nicely formulates the theme with which I 
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would like to begin: >‘What does it matter who is speaking,’ someone said, ‘what does 
it matter who is speaking.’18<,” (205) and Foucault describes this question uttered here 
as an expression of “indifference” (ibid.). Through an analysis of the special status of 
the author’s name and the importance of authorship throughout history, Foucault speaks 
of the ideology imbedded in the concept of the author and in the concept of the genius 
of the author which disguises that every author-subject exists due to “points of insertion, 
modes of functioning, and system[s] of dependencies” (221), meaning that every author 
is socially situated in a certain position that enables her to become an author, and thus, 
the author speaks from that very position. Thus Foucault asks how it is that this subject 
came to inhabit a position in society from which to legitimately be a recognised author: 
“How, under what conditions, and in what forms can something like a subject appear 
in the order of discourse? What place can it occupy in each type of discourse, what 
functions can it assume, by obeying what rules?” (221). Of course, this, at first, seems 
contrary to the Beckett quote above, namely the expression of ‘indifference’ that is “one 
of the fundamental ethical principles of contemporary writing” (205), but it is not. There 
are two points of importance here. Firstly, one question (What subject can speak in this 
discourse?) should not obliterate another (What matter who’s speaking, - and for 
whom?), instead those two questions should be thought in relation to each other, 
because in defining what kind of subject might be allowed to articulate certain thoughts 
it is also important to see how that subject might be able to speak for another subject 
that does not ‘have’ a voice of its own within the discourse. And secondly, the 
‘indifference’ formulated in Textes pour rien is not articulated by the narrator in the 
                                                 
18 This seems to be a translation of the text by the translator of Foucault’s text, the original Beckett 
translation of his own French text differs both in phrasing and in punctuation: “What matter who’s 
speaking, someone said what matter who’s speaking.” (16). Since Foucault, presumably, read Beckett’s 
text in the original French “Qu’importe qui parle” (Nouvelles et textes pour rien, 143), this different 
rendering of the French is negligible. 
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text but by someone else. The narrator is quoting something that another person (or 
another being) has said (‘someone said’).   
 Although Beckett’s narrative throughout Textes pour rien does not offer 
anything similar to a storyline where the chosen point of view would be a politically 
potent choice, the problem of giving voice to someone else’s point of view in a narrative 
is clearly depicted: “what would I say, if I had a voice, who says this, saying it's me?” 
(22). The first question, ‘what would I say,’ can be interpreted as a character in search 
for the words to articulate itself. This question is closely connected to the if-clause. If I 
had a voice to tell my story, how would I narrate my story? The other question 
dismantles this voice that is in search of a voice as a narrative construction, the narrator, 
invented by the author. Then, this narrator seems to come to life and asks back into the 
void: Who is pretending to be me, speaking for me? Who usurped my identity? Further 
down this duplicity is reiterated: “I’m not in his head […] and yet I’m there, for him 
I’m there, with him, hence all the confusion.” (ibid.) It is the paradoxical situation of 
simultaneous presence and absence. The narrator is ‘there’ ‘for him,’ the author. The 
author jolted the narrator into existence and thinks this dynamic is “easy to understand, 
that’s what he says, but he doesn’t understand.” (ibid.) Thus the question of dependency 
of the narrative voice on the author is enunciated and this is a question that lies at the 
very heart of fiction. 
 This  emphasises, that politics do matter in the writing of fiction and that, indeed, 
“Literature is Political,” (564) as Judith Fetterley insisted, and that it does matter how 
the ‘other’ is re-presented as Spivak argued. Understood as a self-referential metatext 
discussing its own existence as literary text in the context of the question of the 
authority of the author, Beckett’s text explores the possibility of taking up a point of 
view that is not based on the author’s own experiences of life, hence the experiencing 
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subject’s revolt (expressed by the narrator) against the imposing authority of the writing 
subject (i.e. the author). It is with this question in mind that we must ask how 
Schnitzler’s interior monologue imagines female subjectivity. Since Else is portrayed 
as frequently contemplating the thought of having a lover, of admiring her own beauty 
and of speculating about other people’s sex lives, an inquiry into the expression of 
female sexuality in this text is vital for the assessment of how the writing subject 
displays the experiencing subject. I will begin by outlining Freud’s interpretation of 
female subjectivity and sexuality in Bruchstücke einer Hysterie-Analyse. Since Freud 
has been heavily criticised by feminists for his conception of women, this will showcase 
the revolt of the experiencing subject against the writing subject. This analysis will help 
situate Schnitzler, since their positions in society are quite similar, both being Jewish 
doctors living in Vienna in the early 20th Century, and will help determine what form 
of socio-political criticism this novella performs. 
 
2.2.2. Re-presentation of Female Subjectivity and Sexuality in Freud and 
Schnitzler 
Freud’s analysis of one of his patients, Ida Bauer, is better known as the “Dora-case.” 
It is noteworthy that Ida Bauer did not deliberately choose to engage in therapy with 
Freud but was forced to do so by her father. She broke off the treatment after three 
months. Freud states in the introduction to the text that he never took notes during the 
sessions and in fact wrote down the entire history after Bauer had terminated the 
treatment. Furthermore it should be mentioned that Freud presents this case study as a 
doctor to the scientific world and thus his interpretation of Ida Bauer and her symptoms 
dominates in his writings, thereby establishing a coherent interpretation which is 
presented in a convincing manner, for his presentation of arguments and logical 
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deduction is quite well done. Ida Bauer is not quoted at length, which might be due to 
the fact that Freud wrote this analysis without documented conversations with her. But 
Freud does not take her criticism into account and the entire case study presents not 
only an interpretation of Ida Bauer, but a validation and legitimation of his 
psychoanalytical theory. Despite this, Ida Bauer’s disagreement with his assessments – 
and even her silences speak volumes – could not be suppressed by Freud’s text. 
 Schnitzler’s novella, on the other hand, seems to depict this very problem of 
applied psychology that excludes women from partaking in the discourse. In her article 
“Hysteria, Feminism and Gender,” Elaine Showalter acquaints her readers with the 
feminist discussion about Dora and explains two opposing opinions: Whereas one side 
sees Dora as a successful rebellion against patriarchy and as a feminist heroine (e.g. 
Hélène Cixous), the other side (e.g. Catherine Clément) declares that Dora did not 
actually have any real voice in the discussion and that “Hysterics sould not be classed 
with feminist heroines, but with deviants and marginals who actually reinforce the 
social structure by their preordained place in the margin. Indeed, their roles are 
ultimately conservative” (Showalter, 332). Showalter concludes that, in fact, “it seems 
paradoxical that Dora [should have been] singled out by women writers and 
intellectuals who have been able to have the education and activity that Ida Bauer 
sought in vain.” (ibid.), especially so since,after Dora had left therapy with Freud, she 
never became a successful woman. Showalter draws on Toril Moi’s analysis of the 
problem, who argues that Freud’s description of the hysteric’s story as ‘incoherent’ 
reveals the “social powerlessness of women’s narratives” (Showalter, 333) and explains 
that “The reason why the neurotic fails to produce coherence is that she lacks the power 
to impose her own connections on her reader/listener” (Moi qtd. in: ibid.). In connection 
with Schnitzler’s Else it is important to see, that Else is neither a neurotic nor a hysteric 
42 
throughout the entire novella. After the public display of her body, her body is inscribed 
with “Hysteria” by society. This is why the examination of (un-)reliable narration is so 
crucial: In the case of Dora, a young girl was declared as unreliable narrator by her 
psychiatrist because she did not accept his interpretation, thereby showing which 
presumptions about women declared Dora as unreliable narrator merely because she 
accepted neither Freud’s theory nor the general opinion about women. Showalter also 
reflects on this problem:  
“But if Freud is an unreliable narrator, a very different plot emerges. […] Dora is a victim of 
Freud’s unconscious erotic feelings about her that affected his need to dominate and control her. 
It’s significant that Dora has no voice in Freud’s text, that we get nothing of her direct dialog, and 
that her historical and Jewish identity are both suppressed. [S]he never became a subject, only the 
object of Freud’s narrative. His interpretations of her problem reflect his own obsessions with 
masturbation, adultery and homosexuality. He never understands her story at all; he simply tries 
to bully her into accepting his version of events. His vaunted penetration of her secrets is really a 
kind of verbal rape. […] His interpretation of her story is more about himself than about her.” 
(319, my emphasis). 
In his case-study, Freud is both focalizor (i.e. the consciousness that experiences the 
encounter) and narrator (i.e. the textual expression). Dora does not even feature as a 
focalising subject. Reading Showalter’s analysis, I am inclined to think that Schnitzler 
might have seen it in a similar light. In fact, Schnitzler heavily criticised Freud for his 
“fixed ideas,” such as the Oedipus complex and called psychoanalysis “one-sided” and 
“monomaniacal” (Schnitzler’s diary entries qtd. in Sherman, 781). This is made visible 
in Fräulein Else. Not only did Schnitzler choose to set the point of view within the 
consciousness of a young woman who is basically being coerced into a socially 
acceptable form of prostitution by her ruthless father, but he represented the fabula in 
such a way as to allow him to accentuate “[dass Else] zur Hysterikerin pathologisiert 
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wird” (Gess 167). Even before analysing society’s behaviour towards Else in the 
novella, Gess demonstrated that Schnitzler’s incorporation of Schumann’s music in the 
text could be read as a defence of Else’s, and thereby also the musician’s, sanity: “Denn 
Schumann war nicht nur Prototyp des schizophrenen Komponisten, sondern auch ein 
Paradebeispiel für [die] Diagnose des Wahnsinns [als ein] gesellschaftliche[r] 
Ausgrenzungsmechanismus” (154), and Gess goes on to argue: “Ganz in diesem Sinne 
diskreditiert die Novelle Elses Verwandte, die […] zur Diagnose ‘Hysterie’ verleitet 
werden.“ (ibid.). This contortion of Else’s state of mind that society carries out is 
predicted earlier in the text by Else herself (that is, Schnitzler created a narrator who 
represents the focalizor in this particular way): “Da unten werden sie meinen, ich bin 
verrückt geworden. Aber ich war noch nie so vernünftig. Zum erstenmal in meinem 
Leben bin ich wirklich vernünftig.“ (364). According to common logic, insanity’s 
opposite is reason. Else’s recognition that society will take her for a lunatic shows that 
she is aware of the social impossibility of her plan – her insistence that she is acting 
reasonably displays the comprehension of the irreparable effect her action will have. 
This insistence also shows her conviction that this is, indeed, the only possible solution 
that does not deny her the possibility to act according to her own sensibility and reason. 
Furthermore, she realises that this is the only option she has if she wants to rebel against 
the social roles that have been imposed on her, and the only way to refuse Dorsday’s 
proposition without losing the financial means to sustain her own (and her mother’s19) 
social status. In addition to all this, this is the only way she can publicly display her own 
desperate situation and it is impressive that she insists on this public display of the 
unjust treatmnet she is experiencing, fully knowing that probably no one (maybe with 
                                                 
19 Although one should not confuse her action with any kind of altruistic behaviour in order to save her 
mother. 
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the exception of Dorsday) will understand what she tries to wordlessly articulate. This 
articulation of the silencing mechanism ends for her tragically: She cannot speak unless 
she is willing to sacrifice herself, i.e. her ‘sanity’ in the eyes of society. 
 Here, I want to add Goodstein’s critique that 
“Shored up by his inability to think that she might separate love and sex, Freud’s conviction 
remained that Dora herself, rather than the world that measured her actions by a cruel double 
standard, was at fault for her neurotic suffering. […] Freud, too, had betrayed her by placing all 
the weapons of psychoanalysis on the side of the world in which the only acceptable role for Dora 
was to be the passive object of masculine desire.” (218). 
This quote is a wonderful point of departure to analyse how Else’s sexuality is 
delineated in the novella. However, since it is important to ask in an interior monologue, 
to speak with Beckett, “Who says this, saying it’s me?” (22)20, I want to begin by 
roughly situating Schnitzler and the meaning of sexuality in his life and work. 
Schnitzler himself was a very prominent literary figure, especially so in Vienna, and 
his play Reigen had been banned from theatres for its open display of sexuality and 
promiscuity. This prominence of sexuality is a general feature in many of Schnitzler’s 
works (such as Traumnovelle [1925/26] or Liebelei [1894]), another recurring theme 
being anti-semitism.21 This interest in sexuality is not only reflected in his writings, but 
also influenced his own life, as depicted in his diaries, in which, according to Sherman 
“he [Schnitzler] described both his affairs and orgasms” (776). Thus the author’s lively 
interest in sexuality also influenced the predominance of sexuality and Else’s own 
interest in sexuality in the novella. Of course, it needs to be analysed in what terms 
                                                 
20 In Beckett’s text, this questions symbolise the focalizor’s revolt against the narrator and the (implied) 
author. 
21 I will not focus much on anti-semitism here; two points are worth noticing. Firstly, that the disapproval 
of Reigen showed clear signs of anti-semitism (see Barker, 2 and Sherman, 776), and, secondly, that an 
earlier draft of Schnitzler’s Fräulein Else specificly describes her as Jewish. These direct affirmations of 
her Jewish identity were later removed, or at least concealed. Throughout the narrative there are hints at 
her Jewish identity, which Barker discusses in detail. 
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Else’s sexuality is depicted and what that tells us about Schnitzler’s assumptions about 
female sexuality. Thus, an analysis of Else’s sexuality will show whether this narrative 
differs from Freud’s in the context of doctor/’patient’ relationships.  
 There are two very obvious aspects concerning Else’s sexuality: Firstly, she is 
very intrigued by the (potential) sex-life of others, especially that of Paul and Cissy. 
She conjectures several times about how an affair unfolds and develops: “Ob Cissy in 
der Nacht ihre Tür offen läßt? Oder sperrt sie ihn erst auf, wenn er klopft? […] Dann 
liegen sie zusammen im Bett. Unappetitlich. Ich werde kein gemeinsames 
Schlafzimmer haben mit meinem Mann und mit meinen tausend Geliebten.“ (337); 
„Wahrscheinlich muss er noch etwas abmachen mit Cissy wegen heute Nacht“ (339); 
Hat sie was an unter dem Schlafrock, wenn sie zu ihm kommt?“ (356). Secondly, she 
makes absolutely no connection between sex and love, nor between love and marriage. 
In Else’s thoughts about her body she imagines someone else seeing her naked or 
fantasises about possible marriages which she always sees in the light of enabling her 
to take lovers. This leads her to reflect upon the difference it makes to be a married 
woman and she connects this idea of marriage with the possibility of having affairs and 
with the freedom to dress and act more liberally: “Der Ausschnitt ist nicht tief genug; 
wenn ich verheiratet wäre, dürfte er tiefer sein.” (334); “Er weiß offenbar nicht recht, 
was er mit mir reden soll. Mit einer verheirateten Frau wäre es einfacher. Man sagt eine 
kleine Unanständigkeit und die Konversation geht weiter.“ (340). This proves that she 
is absolutely aware of her social situation. She could not possibly take a lover because 
that might compromise her entire life. In addition, this highlights that she does indeed 
separate love from sex. She delights in seeing herself in the role of perfected beauty 
that is admired by a male spectator and thereby reiterates male constructions of female 
sexuality. But she does so only in this particular desire to be considered as a beautiful 
46 
body and thereby excludes different male constructions of female sexuality, namely 
that she should not fantasise about displaying her naked body. Similarly, the most 
important thing for her in a sexual encounter is not that she is being loved by the 
observing man but that she wants to have an affair with a ‘pretty face,’ as I would phrase 
it. She constantly evaluates men according to their beauty: “Der Marinefähnrich 
Brandel […]. Frecher Kerl. Aber hübsch.” (327); “der schöne Schwarze mit dem 
Römerkopf“ (328); “der lange blonde Mensch mit den leuchtenden Augen“ (356). This 
does not mean that she is superficial but that she is sexually attracted to someone she 
considers pretty, which is not unusual. Contrarily to stereotypes, she does not confuse 
attraction with love but separates her desire to love and be loved very distinctly from 
sex: “Ich bin nicht verliebt. In niemanden. Und war auch noch nie verliebt. Auch in 
Albert bin ich’s nicht gewesen, obwohl ich es mir acht Tage lang eingebildet habe. Ich 
glaube, ich kann mich nicht verlieben. Eigentlich merkwürdig. Denn sinnlich bin ich 
ganz gewiß.“ (327). This is also stressed due to the fact that all her fantasies revolve 
around sexuality and not about idealistic romantic love, as is also indicated by her desire 
to have multiple lovers. “Ich werde hundert Geliebte haben, tausend, warum nicht?” 
(334). 
 But not only has Schnitzler created Else’s sexuality quite contrarily to social 
standards and stereotypical male designation, he also seems to have been fully aware 
of the problematic gender-relations involved. This can be shown through certain motifs 
that recur throughout the text. The first thing to notice is that Else is a well-taught 
woman and that everyone thinks she’s charming. She exclaims herself that they will all 
care for her when she’s ill but that no one sees her as a subject of her own accord (see 
356). Hence her isolation from society. As noted above, Gess sees this isolation as 
indicated by the form of the interior monologue. She connected this narrative style with 
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‘Freie Fantasie’ and described the constructed unconstructedness of both forms. The 
question whether this could be read as a sign that Else’s isolation if only a textual 
construction depends on the way this isolation is illustrated in the narrative text and 
whether we conceive these manifestations as reliable or not. In order to analyse this I 
want to trace this question in connection to gender-relations. 
 Else’s status as a women in society means that she is not allowed to pursue a 
career, but instead she depends on a male relative for monetary support. Although her 
parents do not assign her a partner in marriage, it is manifested that they would have 
looked favourably upon a match with an older, but wealthy, gentlemen even if they 
knew that their daughter did not like him (see 355). Thus far, an interpreter can rely on 
Else’s account. This gets more intricate when she realises that her father knew what 
Dorsday would ask of her. According to Else’s interpretation, this means that in 
precarious situations her parents (especially her father, because she does not presuppose 
that her mother was aware of this) would basically be willing to sell her off into a 
socially acceptable mode of prostitution. But is this reliable information? As the reader 
only knows what she thinks to be true, this is difficult to verify. At this point it helps to 
clarify that question by taking Vogt’s discussion of the Possible-Worlds Theory and his 
connection to cognitive science into account. He states that “a reader can monitor how 
a narrator or focalizor makes sense of data and arrives at his conclusions and evaluations 
about the events in the fictional universe and compare these with his own interpretative 
processes.” (148). What happens to our literary interpretation when we observe the text 
with Vogt’s statement in mind? As I already mentioned, Else takes a vivid interest in 
the possibility that Paul and Cissy are having an affair. At first, her suspicion is 
described: “Daß sie was miteinander haben, Cousin Paul und Cissy Mohr, darauf 
schwör‘ ich.“ (324). It is obvious that Else does not have any certain evidence and that 
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her evaluation is based on her observation of the behaviour of the two. The reader 
witnesses this behaviour when Else sees them standing at some distance. “Sie sehen 
mich nicht. Was sagt er ihr denn? Warum lacht sie so blitzdumm?“ (338). The element 
of the text simply narrates that Else sees Paul and Cissy, but they do not see her which 
could be ascribed to the nightfall, but Cissy states not long after this that her hairdresser 
would visit her at 7pm and we know that it is summertime22. The interest in what he is 
saying to Cissy is already part of the level of the story and the focalizor, especially the 
demeaning phrasing ‘blitzdumm’ expresses the focalizor’s emotions. Nevertheless, it 
can be said that Else’s interpretation of their behaviour is not unfounded. At the end of 
the novella Else’s perceptive analysis of the situation is verified. This reinforces her 
state as a reliable focalizor. There is another aspect of the story that underlines her 
reliability. When she first receives the letter, the reader is presented with the actual 
textual data. The letter is long and highlights her father’s effort to manage his situation. 
Her mother’s narrative does not in any way lay blame on Else’s father but tries to acquit 
him of his guilt: “der Papa ist zum geringsten Teil daran Schuld” (331). In stark contrast 
to this, every time she apologises to Else for putting her into such a situation, she 
addresses her as “Mein liebes, liebes Kind”; “mein liebes gutes Kind” (ibid.), as though 
she wanted her to feel guilty if she did not succeed. This is stressed again in the telegram 
“Sonst alles vergeblich.” (361), meaning that if Else does not succeed everythin is lost, 
and thus, saving her father is made out to be her responsibility. It is crucial to have this 
external textual data because it allows the interpreter to more easily distinguish between 
a reliable focalizor/narrator and an unreliable one. This textual data shows how these 
narratives are trying to manipulate Else’s feelings. Hence, it does seem convincing to 
accept Else as reliable focalizor who is very observant and who sees through social 
                                                 
22 “wundervolle Sommernacht heute, beinahe warm,“ says Dorsday (347).  
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conventions. In order to further prove this analysis I will juxtapose Else’s interpretation 
of external textual data with Daniel Prince’s, the focalizor in Dujardin’s novel Les 
Lauriers sont coupés. This comparison will show two different types of representing 
the focalizor within the narrative of an experiencing consciousness.  
 Les Lauriers son coupés was also written in the form of interior monologue, 
also includes music sheets, text segments in italics and external textual data. The scene 
in which external textual data enters the narrative is the scene in which the protagonist, 
Daniel Prince, looks through old letters that he had received from Leah, a rather poor 
actress, and his own diary notes. Daniel spends a lot of his time thinking about Leah 
and idealising her as his true love. This is contrasted, firstly, by Leah’s letters in which 
she almost always pleads for money, and secondly, by his own contradictory 
statements. There is one diary entry in which he plans on telling Leah that he loves her 
and therefore will not demand of her any more physical attentions.23 Yet, he never 
manages to tell her this and continues his courtship (including his attempts to obtain 
physical compensation in return for his money) and insists on claiming that he loves 
her, even though he often fantasises about other women he sees on the street or in a 
restaurant (see esp. pp. 25-30). Here, there is a clear discrepancy between what the 
protagonist says he feels and what he then goes about doing. Daniel Prince is clearly 
self-delusional about his own feelings and his real intentions, as can be seen most 
clearly through the external textual data provided in this narrative. As in Fräulein Else 
the protagonist is the focalizor while the textual signs are transmitted through a ‘neutral’ 
narrator, but the effect is a very different one. While the outer world constantly (and 
                                                 
23 “Dearest, I have thought deeply of all that has passed between us; I desired you – passionately; that 
is my only excuse; I forced myself on you and now I ask you to forgive me. I might pass this night in your 
arms, dear, but - . Good-bye, beloved, I give you back your body and I leave you now. . . because I love 
you.” (77).  
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throughout the entire novel) denounces Daniel Prince as unreliable focalizor, Else is 
even reinstated as reliable through external textual data. Thus while the focalizor’s 
assessment of reality in Les Lauriers is contradicted by the way this focalizor is 
represented within the narrative (by means of e.g. external textual data), Else’s 
assessment of reality is not contradicted by anything within the narrative, which shows 
that she is an intelligent young woman who is deeply aware of social conventions and 
social rules and is capable of accurately interpreting her situation. This is also stressed 
by her interpretation of marriage, when she states “es geschähe ihnen ganz recht, ihnen 
allen, sie haben mich ja doch nur daraufhin erzogen, daß ich mich verkaufe, so oder so. 
[…] Und es wäre ihnen ganz recht gewesen im vorigen Jahr, wenn ich den Direktor 
Wilomitzer geheiratet hätte, der bald fünfzig ist.“ (355). After thinking about accepting 
Dorsday’s condition she realises: “Wenn ich einmal heirate, werde ich es 
wahrscheinlich für billiger tun.“ (333). This is quite an adequate description of the 
patriarchal exchange-policy and these legitimate reflections on the condition of women 
in society demonstrate her critical thinking. This also intensifies her sensation of 
loneliness and isolation, for there is no real place for her in the world: 
“Nein, ich will ihn nicht sehen. Ich kann ihn nicht mehr sehen. Ich will niemanden mehr sehen. 
Ich will nicht mehr ins Hotel, ich will nicht mehr nach Hause, ich will nicht nach Wien, zu 
niemand will ich, zu keinem Menschen, nicht zu Papa und nicht zu Mama, nicht zu Rudi und 
nicht zu Fred, nicht zu Berta und nicht zu Tante Irene.“ (354f.) 
 Having now established Else as a trustworthy focalizor, I want to return to the 
problematic gender-relations within the narrative. In comparing Fräulein Else to Emilia 
Galotti, Bettina Matthias argues that whilst father-figure and seducer were fighting over 
the female body in Lessing’s play, in Schnitzler’s novella those two opposing figures 
have “basically joined the same ideological camp” (253), and due to that “Else has no 
real support or support-group any more.” (258). Of course, in the novella the father is 
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not even at the same location and the comparison to Emilia Galotti lacks a vital 
connection. Else is supposed to rescue her father, and not the other way around, and 
Emilia Galotti is seduced and then ‘rescued’ by her father, while Else is disgusted by 
Dorsday’s advances towards her. This is made clear throughout the entire narrative text 
and can be read as symbolically indicating the silencing of women in patriarchal 
society. Already in the beginning, Else does not find him to be a likeable person and 
her dislike and almost fear of Dorsday is intensified when she forces herself to speak to 
him about her father’s problem. “Das hat er nett gesagt, aber meinen Arm braucht er 
darum nicht zu berühren.“ (341). This unmistakable unwanted physical contact bothers 
her, but within this society, and especially under these circumstances, she is not allowed 
to express that she feels uncomfortable. “Warum drückt er seine Knie an meine, 
während er da vor mir steht. Ach, ich lasse es mir gefallen. Was tut’s! Wenn man einmal 
so tief gesunken ist. […] Ja, ja drück‘ die Knie nur an, du darfst es dir ja erlauben.“ 
(342). She already feels like she has to comply with his wishes and Dorsday silences 
her voice completely through his inappropriate physical contact that should more 
accurately described as sexual harassment: 
“Was ist das? Er faßt nach meiner Hand? Was fällt ihm denn ein? […] Er soll meine Hand 
loslassen! Nun, Gott sei Dank, er läßt sie los. Nicht so nah, nicht so nah. […] Warum so nah, du 
Schuft? Ich will deinen Atem nicht auf meinen Wangen. […] Nein, nein, ich will nicht. Warum 
sag‘ ich’s denn nicht. Bring‘ dich um, Papa! Was will er denn mit meiner Hand? Ganz schlaff ist 
mein Arm. Er führt meine Hand an seine Lippen. Heiße Lippen. Pfui!“ (345-347, my emphasis). 
The reader witnesses Else’s inability to speak out against him and also her afflicted 
reaction to her own silence. She cannot even explain to herself why she endures his 
physical advances. Furthermore, this should be classified not only as physical, but also 
as psychological/mental abuse: Her powerlessness and her inability to speak are not her 
fault. It is Dorsday who puts her into a situation where she is simply petrified and 
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defenceless – and then exploits this situation. An additional point of importance is that 
Dorsday takes the liberty to do so even before she has asked him about the money. 
Thus, he is not even trying to ‘buy’ himself the right to make these advances towards 
her, but exploits her desperation during which she is unable to openly manifest her 
disapproval and disgust, showcasing the common case in patriarchal societies for men 
to feel they ‘have the right’ to behave in such a way. But Dorsday not only exploits this 
physically, this silence is also convenient for him because it enables him to vindicate 
and acquit himself from any blame and to indirectly articulate that in his opinion he has 
the right to treat her in this way: 
“Ja, Else, man ist eben nur ein Mann, und es ist nicht meine Schuld, daß Sie so schön sind, Else. 
[…] Sie sehen mich an Else, als wenn ich verrückt wäre. Ich bin es vielleicht ein wenig, denn es 
geht ein Zauber von ihnen aus […]. Sie werden möglicherweise ahnen, daß ein Mann zu Ihnen 
spricht, der ziemlich einsam und nicht besonders glücklich ist und der vielleicht einige Nachsicht 
verdient.“ (345-347, italics in the original, my emphasis). 
These lines reiterate perfectly the abomination of the typical male discourse that 
objectifies women, denying them an autonomous status as Subject while 
simultaneously blaming them for being culpable of having seduced the male subject. 
Personally, I cannot read these lines without feeling deeply disturbed and disgusted – 
and Else’s (probably very similar) reaction to this speech is reflected within. She seems 
to display bewilderment at his speech, since she looks at him ‘as though he were crazy,’ 
thereby indicating that he realises her discomfort and nonetheless keeps imposing his 
point of view unto her. 
But this is not only a male discourse because in a patriachal society women have 
been instructed to fear and hate each other and this depicts the intricate relationship 
between women within a society where female proximity is ultimately turned into 
female hostility due to fear of association with the ‘outcast’ woman and thus becoming 
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an ‘outcast’ themselves. From this perspective it becomes more evident why 
Schnitzler’s novella features so much female hostility, one that can be seen in Else’s 
relationshipt with her mother, her aunt and with Cissy. This female hostility expresses 
itself, for instance, through her aunt’s refusal to travel with Else in the same part of the 
train and with society’s interpretation of Else’s behaviour as an hysterical attack. It is 
interesting to examine more closely why this happens. As Showalter investigates the 
historical circumstances of Ilza Veith, an early woman doctor who wrote Hysteria. 
History of a Disease in 1965, she explains that this has even been a major problem for 
early female doctors and psychologists. Although being a woman in science, Veith 
trusted completely in Freud’s analysis of hysteria and did not question its assumptions 
about female sexuality. Showalter emphasises, however, that it would not be productive 
to criticise her unwillingness to compromise herself with a feminist position, because 
“Veith, like many other women writing about hysteria, felt pressured to avoid a 
feminism traditionally linked with the disorder itself.” (329). One time in Veith’s life 
this led to her ignoring severe symptoms like “migraine headaches, disturbed vision, 
and olfactory hallucinations” (331). She did not go to the doctor because these 
symptoms “were frequently attributed in the medical literature to women with 
‘hysterical personality’” (ibid.). When she finally entered the hospital with a paralysis 
on her left arm, she was not taken seriously as a scholar of medicine and expected to 
submit to the doctor’s treatment. Her left arm was never cured (see ibid.). This had an 
impact not only on female doctors but also on women writers, as Jennifer Redman 
argues in her essay on Else Lasker-Schüler, where she shows what impact the social 
stereotype of women as hysterics had on Lasker-Schüler’s life and writing. These texts 
indicate clearly what was at stake for a woman in a certain social role if she wanted to 
defend women (or herself, for that matter) who were being excluded from and 
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marginalised by society. As an ultimate rehabilitation of the male subject as the only 
capable sex, it was almost impossible for women to help each other. Instead, if they 
wanted to be saved they needed a male protector. This is also hinted at in Fräulein Else. 
Paul tries to dissuade his mother from prematurely condemning Else to an asylum, 
although his attempts are certainly very vague and do not explicitly state what he thinks. 
In the atmosphere of distress his speech could also be designated to merely calm down 
his mother: “Aber Mama, jetzt ist doch nicht der Moment davon zu reden. […] Es wird 
nicht das Geringste passieren, Mama. Ich garantiere dir, daß du keinerlei 
Ungelegenheiten haben wirst.“ (376). It seems that Schnitzler was aware of his 
precarious status as male (doctor) who writes in defence of a young woman. Of course, 
this is the complete inversion of Freud’s analysis of Dora. In fact, it seems likely that 
Schnitzler would have agreed with Showalter’s interpretation of the entire affair (see 
above). 
Goodstein argues that  
“[Dora’s] departure may better be seen as an expression of the truth [Freud] did not wish to see, 
the truth that psychoanalysis was not, after all, outside the patriarchal circuit of exchange. Else’s 
self-exposure is, in the context of Schnitzler’s narrative, even more eloquent. She does indeed 
show them all, though Dorsday may be the only one to have understood her mute speech.” (221). 
This point seems very convincing and I would read Else’s immobility after her exposure 
as a metaphor for her status in society. This reiterates her inability to reject Dorsday’s 
physical advances during their conversation and displays the silencing of not merely 
her voice or her body, but a silencing of her point of view as reliable narration. Thereby, 
she is stripped of her status as subject once more, meaning that any analysis of her 
situation will be constructed similarly to the way Freud constructed Dora’s: “’When 
she was in a bitter mood,’ writes Freud, ‘she was overcome by the notion that she had 
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been delivered over to Herr K as the price for his tolerating the relations between Dora’s 
father and his wife’” (Goodstein, 216). Freud was convinced that this could not be the 
case and suggested that Dora was actually in love with Herr K. (see ibid., 215f.). Else’s 
situation is similar, because her point of view is not taken into consideration. The only 
possible interpretation they inscribe into her immobility is that she had a ‘hysterischen 
Anfall’. The great difference this narrative makes is that it was conceived as interior 
monologue that allowed the reader to stay within the consciousness of the silenced 
woman and witness the full extent of her paralysed and helpless situation. 
 It is noteworthy that Cissy seems to be the only one to suspect that Else has not 
fainted and is capable of hearing them (see Schnitzler 378). Alas, her opinion is not 
even considered to be worth listening to. At the very end, the narrative is taking a 
repetitive course. The female voice that tries to narrate events in a different manner is 
silenced by the male doctor, Paul (who is also her lover). Later, when she and Paul are 
standing next to Else this scene occurs: “Aber Cissy, was tust du denn?< - >Nun, ich 
umarme dich. Warum denn nicht? Sie hat sich auch nicht geniert.<” (379). Hereby, 
Cissy not only refers to Else’s act of disrobing and her admiration for Else’s 
shamelessness. Although Paul rejected Cissy’s analysis of the situation, he nevertheless 
does not want to display his affair with Cissy in front of Else, even though he had 
previously explained the same thought to his mother: “In diesem Zustand sind die Sinne 
manchmal unheimlich geschärft.” (377). This relates a lot about the gender-relations 
that are at work, namely that only a male doctor has the ability (and authority) to 
correctly describe the state of the female ‘patient’. Thus far the juxtaposition of Freud 
and Schnitzler has shown, that Schnitzler’s depiction of female subjectivity and 
sexuality are much more nuanced than Freud’s. Instead of trying to incorporate a young 
woman’s narrative into an already existing psychoanalytical category, Schnitzler shows 
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that social realities are much more complex than an interpretation of repressed sexual 
desires. Thus, it does matter who’s speaking, since, to some extent, the sovereignty of 
interpretation lies within the position of the subject who has the power to articulate 
point of view. However, as Spivak has shown in her essay, representational politics are 
complicated and often lead to misconceptualisations of the ‘other’. The question how 
to circumnavigate such complications remains, and even though Schnitzler’s text 
performs representational politics decently, it only functions within them. The answer 
needs to be sought elsewhere. 
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III.  HAN KANG’S THE VEGETARIAN 
HOW TO RE-PRESENT THE UN-RE-PRESENTABLE? 
 
This project started out as an analysis of Schnitzler’s Fräulein Else, which I have more 
recently counterposed to Freud’s Bruchstücke eine Hysterie-Analyse. Between them, 
there is, of course, an obvious connection, which has already been written about in 
many texts. What is fascinating about these two texts specifically is that they both try 
to do the same thing in very different ways: They try to give voice to the ‘hysteric,’ 
Schnitzler by emphasising the social circumstances and the sensibility of the young girl 
who is constructed as a hysteric by society – and Freud through psychoanalysis and 
therapy, which was his way of trying to ‘give voice’ to the hysterics, i.e. making their 
stories heard. Thus, Freud’s project was to re-translate the somatic expressions of the 
unconscious into ‘logos,’ i.e. the discourse of reason but it was also an attempt to 
reexamine coeval preconceptions about hysterics. The purpose of his analysis was to 
re-evaluate their situation, to change the narrative from their inherent ‘madness’ to a 
narrative that proposed that hysterical seizures were mere somatic expressions of 
repressed sexual desires. Hence, the importance of therapy and communication as ‘the 
talking cure’ for psychoanalytical theory. Schnitzler’s novella is very similar to Freud’s 
approach in that Schnitzler creatively ‘gives voice’ to a ‘hysteric’. He uses the narrative 
structure of interior monologue in order to suggest that what is perceived as ‘hysteria’ 
in society is merely the expression of social oppression (and blackmailing, in this 
particular story). 
 As third literary text I chose The Vegetarian by South Korean author Han 
Kang.24 Interpretations of The Vegetarian have mostly focussed on the themes of love, 
                                                 
24 It should be said, however, that due to my lack of knowledge of Korean, my analysis inevitably 
depends on the translation by Deborah Smith. Smith’s translation was heavily criticised by the Korean 
media for being inaccurate and, sometimes, linguistically wrong. To counteract this lack of knowledge 
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depression and violence but have also developed feminist and eco-feminist readings of 
the novel.25 Thus, Bae Byung-hoon, a Korean PhD Candidate in Religious Studies at 
Sogang University (as of 2017), argues that all characters in The Vegetarian are lonely 
beings, who cannot find meaning in their lives and therefore feel depressed or have 
suicidal impulses.26 Arguing something similar, but from a different standpoint, Kim 
Myung-Joo suggests that the novel proposes a re-imagining of the human and the 
importance of love and non-violence and the ‘Homo Amans,’ “not as a successful 
achiever of love but as a doomed failure who nevertheless keeps on loving” (91). There 
has also been an eco-feminist analysis of the text by Rinci Chandran and Geetha R. Pai, 
and an analysis of The Vegetarian in connection to the ethics of veganism by Caitlin E. 
Stobie, both of which emphasise the active decision of the protagonist to change her 
behaviour on ethical grounds. As Jina Kim argued in her presentation of the controversy 
around the translation by Smith, ‘feminist’ readings of The Vegetarian that conceive of 
Yeong-hye’s behaviour as rebellious might be due to the translation. According to Kim, 
the translation portrays the protagonist as more active than the Korean text does. In fact, 
even the translation itself does portray the protagonist in terms of passivity, mostly so 
through the descriptions of the focalizor/narrators. Mr. Cheong, Yeong-hye’s husband, 
describes her as “unresponsive” (7) and compares her to “some kind of ghost, silently 
standing its ground” (ibid.) in the scene where he first encounters her standing in the 
kitchen in the middle of the night and is unnerved by “her complete lack of reaction” 
(ibid.). This aspect of passivity that can be seen in the English translation as well should 
be emphasised. This passivity, however, has been interpreted as activism by Stobie who 
                                                 
I draw on Jina Kim’s presentation on the translation controversy given at the UO, Winter 2019. The fact 
that it is a translation intensifies my main questions: Who’s speaking, for whom and whose voice is that 
anyway? I will not discuss the issue of translation here in detail. For a more detailed account of the 
controversy around Smith’s translation see “Appendix: Whose Voice is it Anyway – in Translation?”.  
25 Unfortunately, I can only refer to academic research in English. This certainly limits my approach. 
26 I am relying on the abstract, which was translated into English. The paper itself is in Korean. 
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interprets Yeong-hye’s vegetarianism as connected to her realisation that the female body 
and the animal body are subjected to similar rules (see 794). Therefore Stobie proposes, 
that Yeong-hye herself detects the intersectionality of oppression and suffering that the 
novel unravels. On an extra-textual plane, I agree with her interpretation, however, I would 
not endorse her argument that Yeong-hye herself realises this and therefore stops eating 
meat. In fact, her determination to become a vegetarian, and, later on, to stop consuming 
food altogether, is rooted in the force of aggression that dwells within her. It is the 
realisation of her “Intolerable loathing, so long suppressed. Loathing, I’ve always tried to 
mask with affection.” (28), which is (maybe not exclusively) directed at her husband as an 
earlier segment indicates: “If you knew how hard I’ve always worked to keep my nerves in 
check.” (19), she says, apparently in an imaginary conversation addressed to her husband 
(“The morning before I had the dream, […] – remember? You got angry.” [ibid.]). Thus, it 
seems plausible to read (in a quite Freudian manner) her “Dreams of Murder” (28) as a 
phantasy that symbolises her desire to kill her husband. However, the dreams do not stop 
after she is divorced and lives by herself, indeed, the third chapter of the novel is the only 
one in which Yeong-hye is not haunted by dreams and instead the dreams have become a 
source of knowledge to her.27 She has not comprehended “the intersection of varying forms 
of oppression between all living beings” (794), as Stobie argues, but has, through her sexual 
encounter with her brother in-law, recognised her own interest in plants, her love (and 
sexual desire) for plants and is therefore able to draw the conclusion to not consume any 
type of food anymore, since that would mean killing plants.28 Hence the changed nature of 
                                                 
27 Interestingly, her epiphany that the tree’s equivalent to the human head would be its roots is similar to 
what scientists believe nowadays, namely that there are certain transmitters of information and nutrition, 
which are located in the roots and fulfil a function analogous to neurons in the animal brain. (see e.g. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q-4w5xYLwiU) 
28 Plants themselves (or, namely, trees) are envisioned as the epitome of peaceful living, a form of living 
that is free of violence. This certainly romanticises plants, since there is an immense variety of plants 
who are either carnivores (e.g. pitcher plants), parasitic plants (such as orchids) or plants like the black 
walnut tree, who poisons his neighbours through toxic chemicals. Thus, plants are not necessarily as 
peaceful as we might imagine them to be. 
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her dreams. This seems compatible with a recent article by Yoo Yo-han who proposed to 
read Yeong-hye’s desire to become a plant as a longing for a return to a mythical time in 
which “animals and humans coexisted harmoniously and human lives were organically 
united to those of plant” (157).29 
 As can be seen, it is vital to distinguish between the different layers of the narrative 
(see my account of Mieke Bal above). Stobie’s analysis is based on the text itself and thus 
misinterprets the protagonist. Even though the novel can be interpreted as a depiction of 
the intersectionality of oppression, it should be clearly distinguised from what the 
protagonist’s own interpretation of the situation is. Stobie, as well as other interpretations, 
conflate these two planes of signification. Thus, a comparison with Schnitzler and Freud 
helps highlight the (socio-political) importance of such a distinction. There is no ‘factual’ 
or biographical connection to either Freud or Schnitzler, instead the connection can be 
drawn in terms of the performance of the novel and the overlapping themes (e.g. mental 
illness): The Vegetarian actually performes the exact opposite of both Freud’s 
Bruchstücke einer Hysterie Analyse and Schnitzler’s Fräulein Else. All three texts re-
present the protagonist but their mode of re-presentation is completely different. 
Through an analysis and comparison of these three modes of re-presentation I will 
revisit Spivak’s criticism of Foucault and Deleuze. Her argument that both theorists 
reinstate the idea of a sovereign subjectivity when talking about the subaltern will be of 
consequence here. I have already outlined how female subjectivity and sexuality are re-
presented in Freud’s and Schnitzler’s texts. Here I will focus more closely on how the 
re-presentation of the protagonist in Han’s novel functions in comparison to the other 
two texts. Since Han’s novel stages the almost complete absence of the protagonist in 
a way that heightens the emphatic impact of this absence on the reader, this comparison 
                                                 
29 I am relying on the abstract, which was translated into English. The paper itself is in Korean. 
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will help illuminate the possibility of re-presentation through non-representation (i.e. 
absence of the protagonist’s point of view from the narrative) and the importance of 
silence as communication, which I will discuss in the last chapter. 
 In the next section I want to explore the way in which re-presentation 
[darstellen] works in the first part of Han Kang’s The Vegetarian in contrast to 
Schnitzler’s novella and Freud’s analysis of the Dora-case. I will begin by first 
summarising Schnitzler’s form of re-presentation. Secondly, I will present an analysis 
of Sigmund Freud’s Bruchstücke einer Hysterie-Analyse which will highlight the 
complications that emerged in this specific case from a male doctor writing about his 
female patient. And thirdly, I will show how the first chapter in Han Kang’s The 
Vegetarian (also ‘The Vegetarian’) mimics the structual problem that is inherent in 
Freud’s text, but in such a way as to draw attention to the faultiness of such an analysis.  
 
3.1 Re-presentation and (un-)reliability in The Vegetarian 
3.1.1 A short Summary: Schnitzler & Fräulein Else 
Schnitzler chose to re-present Else through close identification with her. The choice of 
interior monologue emphasises this connection. The protagonist is re-presented as 
being able to present her point of view on her own terms, in her own voice. This, of 
course, is a mere simulation, artificially constructed, but the effect is quite well done. 
The interior monologue manages to establish an emotional connection between reader 
and protagonist, influencing the reader towards a desire to understand Else. As I have 
outlined earlier, Else’s consciousness is depicted as non-coherent and vivid. Through 
reevaluation of the situation she changes her opinions. This incoherence, however, is 
not a-logical but accurately reflects the mechanism of decision-making processes. Thus, 
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while the depiction of an experiencing consciousness might be incoherent in the sense 
that there is no straight line of argument, her thought process, her reasoning is still 
coherent. This is important to underline, since it shows that although every 
consciousness works in a non-coherent fashion and consequently can be narrated as 
such. However, it does not follow that the reasoning-process is unreasonable. The 
strength of Schnitzler’s novella is that it manages to walk this very fine line of depicting 
[re-presenting] how the incoherent consciousness makes sense of its world and knows 
how to accurately interpret it. Furthermore this consciousness is that of a young woman 
and through the re-presentation of her as reasonable she is re-presented as being a 
reliable source of information about and an accurate interpreter of her world. Thereby 
the (male) interpretation of that world (Else’s father, Dorsday and Paul) and society’s 
reaction to her (her aunt) is systematically undermined. 
 
3.1.2 A Re-examination: Freud & Ida Bauer 
Freud begins his Bruchstücke einer Hysterie-Analyse (1905) with a preface explaining 
his decision to publish this case study. He explicitly states that he is publishing his 
analysis without his patient’s consent and argues that if he had asked, he would have 
been denied the permission. Since Ida Bauer had been his patient, this public discussion 
is a breach of confidence. The fact that the names of everyone mentioned are altered 
does not change this. Freud presents two arguments to justify his decision: Firstly, since 
the names are changed it should be impossible for anyone to figure out who Dora or the 
other parties involved are. Since her real name is well known today, this calculation did 
not work out. Secondly, he argues that even though his duty as a doctor is to uphold 
confidentiality, even after the treatment has been terminated, he also has another duty. 
One that contradicts the dictum of confidentiality: His duty to science and to its 
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development. Furthermore, he sees the necessity of publishing this in the fact that his 
earlier publications had been criticised for not disclosing information about the case 
studies that led him to his theoretical understanding of hysteria in particular, and mental 
illness in general. (see 9f.). Another concern that he addresses in this preface is a 
question that is even more closely related to re-presentation [darstellen]. He explains 
that he had never taken notes during the session because it could cause a sensation of 
mistrust in the patient and, additionally, would prevent himself from paying close 
attention to all the details. He  points out that of the two dreams that were 
essential for his analysis he had taken notes directly after the session, taking care to 
write down the exact words. Since the entire treatment lasted less than three months 
and since he wrote down the entire case study directly after the termination of the 
treatment, he assures that there are no flaws in his recordings (see 12). 
 Even though both of these explications show that he was concerned about them, 
there is an essential fallacy: He does not question his own method of analysis, nor does 
he even entertain the possibility of having misinterpreted his patient. He explicitly 
states: “Die Krankengeschichte selbst habe ich erst nach Abschluß der Kur aus meinem 
Gedächtnisse niedergeschrieben, solange meine Erinnerung noch frisch und durch das 
Interesse an der Publikation gehoben war.“ (12, my emphasis).30 Why did he 
immediately know he wanted to publish this case? Since the patient had left him before 
termination of the treatment, before having been ‘cured’ – why have such an interest in 
publishing it? And why does his patient’s refusal to continue the treatment not make 
him question his analysis? Why does he not further examine his own determination to 
                                                 
30 In the revision of 1923 he writes he wrote everyting “in den nächstfolgenden zwei Wochen” 
(15). 
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publish a discontinued case? It is impossible to answer these questions without 
reverting to speculations. Instead, I want to focus on the way Freud is re-presenting 
[darstellen] his ‘protagonist’. 
 The case study is set in between a preface and an afterword, both of which stress 
the validity and importance, and thus consolidate, Freud’s theory, and throughout this 
text, Freud’s interpretation of Ida Bauer (and especially of her dreams) is the prevalent 
content. Even though he does ‘quote’ his patient this text is not so much about his 
patient, but about his interpretation and theorising of hysteria. Although Freud’s 
mission is to unravel the causes of their illness and to ‘give voice’ to their struggles, the 
strictly hierarchical mode of conversation subordinates the voice and opinion of the 
‘hysteric’ to his judgment and interpretation:  
“In Wirklichkeit sind die Kranken unfähig, derartige Berichte über sich zu geben. Sie können 
zwar über diese oder jene Lebenszeit den Arzt ausreichend und zusammenhängend informieren, 
dann folgt aber eine andere Periode, in der ihre Auskünfte seicht werden, Lücken und Rätsel 
lassen und ein andermal steht man wieder vor ganz dunkeln, durch keine brauchbare Mitteilung 
erhellten Zeiten.“ (18, my emphasis). 
Here, Freud is talking about the impossibility of reconstructing the history of the illness 
based only on the description of relatives or, in this specific quote, of the patient. Of 
course, in Freud’s theory of the suppression of sexual desires, the subject herself would 
not know the real cause. After all, that is Freud’s mission: to help the ‘hysteric’ 
acknowledge their real problem, that of a suppressed sexual desire. For Freud, the 
recognition of that suppressed desire is vital, since once it is no longer suppressed, it 
does not need to express itself in the unconscious any longer.31 
                                                 
31 “Wenn das praktische Ziel der Behandlung dahin geht, alle möglichen Symptome aufzuheben und 
durch bewußte Gedanken zu ersetzen, so kann man als ein anderes, theoretisches Ziel die Aufgabe 
aufstellen, alle Gedächtnisschäden des Kranken zu heilen.“ (Freud, 20). 
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 For Freud, the history of the illness, however, can only be complete after a full 
analysis of the patient: “Gegen Ende der Behandlung erst kann man eine in sich 
konsequente, verständliche und lückenlose Krankengeschichte überblicken.“ (20). As 
with all interpretations that follow a strict model of interpretation from which is not to 
be deviated, the history of illness that Freud constructs will be defined by his own 
models of psychoanalytical theory. This is problematic for a couple of reasons. Firstly, 
Freud’s theory of hysteria is pre-existent to this particular case study and therefore his 
interpretation may be biased because he is looking for very specific symptoms with pre-
determined meanings. Secondly, since Freud is the interpretor, the definition of 
‘completeness’ and ‘reasonability’ of the history of the illness will be defined according 
to his concept of them. Hence his denial to accept even the possibility of having 
misinterpreted the situation or misread the ‘signs’. Additionally, this encourages an 
interpretation that will not allow the dissent of the patient to be perceived as legitimate 
criticism worthy of critical inspection. Instead, Freud deliberately undermines Ida 
Bauer’s criticism and takes her silences to express consent and acceptance, if not also 
approval, of his interpretation. Furthermore, some of his storylines are even presented 
without Ida Bauer’s reaction to them, which make it difficult to tell whether she 
concurred or not. To show this, I want to focus on two particular events in Freud‘s 
narrative. First, his re-presentation of one situation that occurred between Herr K. and 
the fourteen-year-old Dora and, second, Freud and Dora’s last session together. 
 At the age of fourteen, Dora had been invited to join Frau K. and her husband 
at Herr K.’s store in the centre of B. (an anonymous town). Together they had planned 
to go and watch “eine kirchliche Feierlichkeit” (30). According to Freud’s narrative 
(and he does not tell how he knows this), Herr K. convinced his wife to stay at home 
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and all his employees had already left when Dora entered the store – this is what 
happens: 
“Als die Zeit der Prozession herannahte, ersuchte er [Herr K.] das Mädchen, ihn bei der Türe, die 
aus dem Laden zur Treppe ins höhere Stockwerk führte, zu erwarten, während er die Rollbalken 
herunterließ. Er kam dann zurück, und anstatt durch die offene Türe hinauszugehen, preßte er 
plötzlich das Mädchen an sich und drückte ihm einen Kuß auf die Lippen. Das war wohl die 
Situation, um bei einem 14jährigen unberührten Mädchen eine deutliche Empfindung sexueller 
Erregtheit hervorzurufen. Dora empfand aber in diesem Moment einen heftigen Ekel, riß sich los 
und eilte an dem Manne vorbei zur Treppe und von dort zum Haustor. […] In der nächsten Zeit 
vermied sie übrigens die Gelegenheit, mit Herrn K. allein zu sein.“ (ibid., my emphasis) 
What I find inexplicable is why Freud was so determined to interpret this situation in 
terms of Dora’s sexuality. In this segment, Freud shows that Dora’s experience was that 
of being deeply disgusted (‘heftigen Ekel’), that she ran away and that she avoided 
situations, in which Herr K. could have repeated his actions. Freud’s psychoanalytic 
analysis of this event does not accept the possibility of that disgust being real and 
instead focuses on disgust as repression mechanism. For him, apparently, any 
sexualised encounter whatsoever, whether consensual or not, is the origin of sexual 
arrousal. His interpretations runs thus: 
“In dieser […] Szene ist das Benehmen des 14jährigen Kindes bereits ganz und voll hysterisch. 
Jede Person, bei welcher ein Anlaß zu sexuellen Erregung überwiegend oder ausschließlich 
Unlustgefühle hervorruft, würde ich unbedenklich für eine Hysterika halten, ob sie nun 
somatische Symptome zu erzeugen fähig sei oder nicht. […] Sie sagte, sie verspüre jetzt noch den 
Druck auf den Oberkörper von jener Umarmung. […] Ich denke, sie verspürte in der stürmischen 
Umarmung nicht bloß den Kuß auf ihren Lippen, sondern auch das Andrängen des erigierten 
Gliedes gegen ihren Leib. Diese ihr anstößige Wahrnehmung wurde für die Erinnerung beseitigt, 
verdrängt und durch die harmlose Sensation des Druckes am Thorax ersetzt, die aus der 
verdrängten Quelle ihre übergroße Intensität bezieht. […] Das Andrängen des erigierten Gliedes 
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hat wahrscheinlich die analoge Veränderung an dem entsprechenden weiblichen Organ, der 
Clitoris, zur Folge gehabt […]“ (30-32, my emphasis). 
Even though he admits the reality of disgust as Dora’s experience, Freud cannot 
conceive of the possibility, that this encounter might not at all have been sexually 
stimulating for Dora. Freud sharply changes the focus of his inquiry due to his analysis, 
the psychoanalytical task being that of making Dora aware of her own sexual desires. 
The problem here is that his subject herself, Dora, is not allowed any opinion in this 
matter. Of course, Freud is far from condoning Herr K’s behaviour, but his rhetoric 
makes clear the (at least unconscious) sexual complicity of Ida Bauer. It seems 
unthinkable to him that Dora might not have been attracted to K, “ein noch jugendlicher 
Mann von einnehmendem Äußern” (31, footnote 2), as Freud describes him. It is 
unthinkable precisely because, according to Freud, the real problem of the hysteric is a 
suppressed sexual desire. Had he not adhered to that conceptualisation of hysteria, he 
could have easily made the argument that, instead of suppressed sexual desire, it is 
sexual violence and harrassment that can trigger ‘hysterical’ behaviour. 
 The second event that is of interest in this context is the session, in which Ida 
Bauer tells Freud that this will be their last session. At the end of the penultimate 
session, before she told Freud in the next session that she would discontinue the 
meetings, Freud recounts this change of words: “Als ich nach Schluß der […] Sitzung 
meiner Befriedigung über das Erreichte Ausdruck gab, antwortete sie geringschätzig: 
Was ist denn da viel herausgekommen?“ (103); and the beginning of the last session:  
„Zur [letzten] Sitzung trat sie mit den Worten an: ‘Wissen Sie, Herr Doktor, daß ich heute das 
letzte Mal hier bin?‘ – Ich kann es nicht wissen, da Sie mir nichts davon gesagt haben. – ‘Ja, ich 
habe mir vorgenommen, bis Neujahr halte ich es noch aus; länger will ich aber auf die Heilung 
nicht warten.‘ […] Wann haben Sie den Entschluß gefaßt?  - ‘Vor 14 Tagen, glaube ich.‘ “ (103f., 
my emphasis.) 
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Apparently, Ida Bauer was sensing that the sessions with Freud were not curing her and 
that she would only be cured after the sessions had ended. Toward the end of this last 
session, Freud argues that the reason for her distress was that Dora had believed Herr 
K’s advances to be serious, that she had expected him to renew his advances and that 
she was angered at having imagined his love to be true (see 107). 32 Freud notices: “Sie 
hatte zugehört, ohne wie sonst zu widersprechen.“ (ibid.), clearly interpreting her 
silence as mute acceptance of his analysis, for he continues to ask: “Ich weiß auch nicht, 
ob Herr K. mehr erreicht hätte, wäre ihm verraten worden, daß jener Schlag ins Gesicht 
keineswegs ein endgültiges ‚Nein‘ Doras bedeutete“ ( 108). Freud begins to mirror 
himself in K. He divulges his interpretation in front of her, and her task is that of 
listening and accepting his analysis.33 Obviously, it is impossible to tell now, how much 
of the time in Freud’s sessions were spent on Freud speaking vs. listening.   
 Similarly, he interprets Dora’s decision to leave him as an act of revenge (see 
107). Instead of asking if there might have been something about his methodology made 
her incapable of continuing the sessions or if he had misinterpreted Dora, Freud focuses 
on transference (‘Übertragung’) to explain why Dora broke of the sessions. He argues 
that he himself had not paid proper attention to the effect of transference and since it 
stayed undetected for too long he could not bring this transference to Dora’s attention. 
                                                 
32 In this last session she tells Freud about a governess who worked for the Ks. The governess told Dora 
that Herr K had seduced her, telling her that he would leave his wife for her. After she had slept with 
him, Herr K. lost interest in her. Freud thus interprets Dora’s slap in the face as inspired by jealousy and 
revenge, instead of asking whether she might have though that Herr K. had behaved like this with many 
other women and therefore refused him. He similarly interprets the 14 days that passed before she told 
her mother about the incident as a time that Dora spent waiting for Herr K. to renew his advances. This 
is similar to his reading of Herr K’s sexual harrassment of Dora when she was 14. Apparently, Freud 
knew little about why survivers of sexual harrassment are afraid to speak up. This question remains vital, 
since one of the main issues for Dora had been Herr K’s denial and her parents’ collaboration in silencing 
her story. 
33 This scene also has certain characteristics in common with the one in Fräulein Else, where Dorsday is 
harrassing Else. 
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According to Freud, Dora had first transferred her feelings for her father onto Freud 
and, later on, she (unconsciously, of course) began to see Herr K. in him (see 116): “So 
wurde ich denn von der Übertragung überrascht, und wegen des X, in dem ich sie an 
Herrn K. erinnerte, rächte sie sich an mir, wie sie sich an Herrn K. rächen wollte, und 
verließ micht, wie sie sich von ihm getäuscht und verlassen glaubte.“ (ibid.). Over a 
year after she had broken off her therapy with Freud, Ida Bauer appeared for a last visit. 
She tells Freud that for roughly four to five weeks she had been “im ‘Durcheinander’” 
(118). After that, her condition began to get better and her seizures occurred less 
frequently. For Freud, his reaction is linked to transference, as he takes care to point 
out when he explains the concept of transference in more general terms: “Der Aufschub 
der Heilung oder der Besserung ist wirklich nur durch die Person des Arztes 
verursacht.” (113), meaning that if the transference has not been recognised early 
enough and, through hints, made visible to the patient, then the mere presence of the 
doctor might limit the improvement of the patient. This concept allows Freud to argue, 
that, actually, it was only after four to five weeks that the transference began to wear 
off and that improvement in the patient could begin to manifest itself. Since there is no 
further reference to other elements of Ida Bauer’s it is impossible to directly contradict 
Freud’s assessment, for within the logic of his own methodology his analysis is carried 
out diligently. 
3.1.3 What’s the Difference? - Han & The Vegetarian 
Han re-presents the protagonist through the lense of her husband, her brother in-law, 
and her sister. For now, I will only focus on the first part “The Vegetarian”. Although 
there are eight different segments in italics in the style of interior monologue that give 
insight into the protagonist’s thoughts, these fragments have the complete opposite 
effect of the interior monologue used by Schnitzler. The fragments are elusive and in 
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contrast to the depiction of Else’s consciousness, there is no continuous re-presentation 
of her consciousness that would enable the reader to comprehend her resolutions. The 
representation of Else’s experiencing consciousness is focused on a very short amount 
of time (everything happens in the time-frame of one single afternoon/early evening). 
In contrast, Yeong-hye’s consciousness is presented in little portions. The reader is 
presented with loose dream-sequences or the protagonist’s remembrance of them, and 
segments that sound similar to diary-entries but could also be an interior monologue, 
which take place within a time-frame of at least 2 months34. The exact time-line of these 
segments is also unclear.  
 What is striking about those segments is that they portray the protagonist in a 
light that is in stark contrast to her external behaviour. Whereas her husband’s 
description of her is one of passivity, inattentiveness and absent-mindedness, these 
segments portray her within a maze of violence and inner turmoil. Her husband’s 
description highlights her search for peace, non-involvement and non-violence in 
contrast with the physical and verbal violence that is done to her (her husband rapes 
her, her father uses physical coercion to try to get her to eat meat; her husband yells at 
her, the passive-aggressiveness of the people at the dinner party with her husband’s 
boss). Yet, her dreams are full of blood (“My bloody hands. My bloody mouth.” [20]), 
physical violence (“Dreams of Murder. Muderer or murdered… […] Dreams overlaid 
with dreams, a palimpsest of horror. Violent acts perpetrated at night.” [35]; “Dreams 
of my hands around someone’s throat, throttling them” [40]), and they speak of treason, 
identity, being onself and being usurped (“I become a different person, a different 
person rises up inside me, devours me, those hours . . .” [40]). But all these elements 
                                                 
34 In the beginning of the first part, it is winter, then “spring came, and still my wife hadn’t backed down.” 
(23). This is before the dinner-episode and the family-meeting, but there are no further time references 
in this chapter. 
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do not only appear in her dreams. They are (or have become) an integral part of 
everyday life: “Intolerable loathing, so long suppressed. Loathing I’ve always tried to 
mask with affection. But now the mask is coming off.” (36); “Those drawn-out waking 
hours my fingers flexing to kill” [40]. This violence is mixed with despair:  
“Can only trust my breasts now. I like my breasts, nothing can be killed by them. Hand, foot, 
tongue, gaze, all weapons from which nothing is safe. But not my breasts. With my round breasts, 
I’m okay. Still okay. So why do they keep on shrinking? Not even round anymore. Why? What 
am I changing like this? Why are my edges sharpening – what I am going to gouge?” (41).  
This last part showcases the inner struggle in it’s most potent form. Whereas all the 
other segments mainly deal with violence and/or phantasies of violence, the perplexity 
at her own physical change, especially the ‘loss’ of her breasts, indicates the violent 
struggle within herself against that violence. Not only against the violence between 
humans, but also the violence done unto all other living creatures. As the author herself 
pointed out, the story is about the question of whether innocence is possible: “I think 
this novel has some layers: questioning human violence and the (im)possibility of 
innocence; defining sanity and madness; the (im)possibility of understanding 
others, body as the last refuge or the last determination, and some more.” (Han qtd. in 
Patrick). This rejection of violence in a struggle for innocence is twofold. Yeong-hye 
strives for innocence for herself, she struggles to hide her aggression, her disposition 
towards violence against others. I read her loathing as directed towards her husband, 
the mask she has been wearing is that of the dutiful house-wife who provides for her 
husband. But, as Han also pointed out, “this novel isn’t a singular indictment of 
the Korean patriarchy” (ibid.). Although not being a negligble element, there are many 
more mechanisms at work here. One of them being the inner battle Yeong-hye fights 
against her aggressive desires, the desire to ‘purify’ herself from violence, which can 
be seen in her rejection of any body part of hers that might inflict harm (see above). 
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Another one being her desire to detach herself physically and mentally from the harm 
that is being done to her.  
 Her physical detachment can be most clearly described through an analysis of 
her reaction to her family when they try to force-feed her meat. This scene is full of 
violence, starting with verbal froms of persuation that express symbolic violence due 
to the circumstances and the imperative of their speech. “This whole vegetarian 
business stops right now” (43) demands her mother at the beginning of the 
conversation. The situation soon escalates with Yeong-hye’s father’s display of 
aggression culminating in his ordering his son and son in-law (Mr. Cheong) to restrain 
Yeong-hye’s body from moving while he himself tries to force meat into her mouth. 
This scene strongly resembles the one in which Mr. Cheong rapes Yeong-hye. Yeong-
hye’s resistance might be called ‘successful’. She refuses to open her teeth. When she 
struggles free she uses a fruit knife in an attempt to physically detach herself from the 
situation. The only way in which Yeong-hye is able to counteract the impossibility to 
communicate with her family, the incapability of her family to understand her – the 
only one who even tries to communicate anything besides their own imperative 
message is In-hye who proposes she should set up a “well-balanced meal plan” (43) if 
she wishes to be a vegetarian – is harming herself. Parodoxically, physical violence is 
the only way she can make her family listen, the only way she can detach herself from 
the violence that is inflicted on her by others. And yet, even this extreme form of 
communication is lost upon them: Her mother’s first rationale is to trick her into eating 
meat by pretending that the food is only herbal medicine.  
 The second segment in italics gives useful interpretative insight into the 
meaning of her loathing and the metaphor of the mask, but it also shows how she 
(successfully) detaches herself mentally from verbal violence. This is the segment that 
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follows her husband’s remarks “This strange situation had nothing to do with me.” (26). 
In this segment, Yeong-hye recounts the events of the day before she “had the dream” 
(ibid), apparently speaking about the first time she had that dream. It is an imaginary 
conversation that she has with her husband: “I was mincing frozen meat – remember? 
You got angry.” (ibid.), intercepting in quotation marks what her husband had yelled at 
her that morning, and what he had yelled at her that evening. There are several 
connections to the other segments. The loathing is foreshadowed: “If you knew how 
hard I’ve always worked to keep my nerves in check.”; and so is the mask after Yeong-
hye recounts cutting herself with the knife: “ Sticking the finger in my mouth calmed 
me. The scarlet color, and now the taste, sweetness masking something else, left me 
strangely pacified.” That evening her husband found a broken off piece of the knife in 
the food, which makes him angry and he yelles at Yeong-hye. Her reaction is quite 
interesting: “I gazed vacantly at your distorted face as you raged. […] Why didn’t this 
agitate me like it should have done? […] everything around me began to slide away, as 
though pulled back on an ebbing tide. […] I was alone, the only thing remaining in all 
of infinite space.” It is not quite clear what she means with ‘agitating,’ whether she 
should have been agitated by the thought that something might have happened to her 
husband had he swallowed the piece of knife or whether she should have been agitated 
by his yelling at her. However, the sentence quoted above about how she always worked 
hard ‘to keep her nerves in check’ suggests that it is the latter. Thus, her husband’s 
verbal violence functions in this moment similarly to the way in which the colour and 
taste of her own blood had earlier that day – and similarly to when she cuts herself at 
the family-meeting – only that this form of mental detachment is non-violent and leaves 
no other impression in the physical world apart from an expression of absent-
mindedness. Instead of detaching herself from the violence inflicted on her in an act of 
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physical violence against herself, she detaches herself from the verbal violence through 
an ‘act’ of mental detachment. Although, in a strict sense, she doesn’t ‘act’ at all, it is 
rather this mental detachment that acts on her.  
 Although these segments do not re-present a logical strain of thought, they 
nonetheless provide an insight into Yeong-hye’s mind. They not only re-present that 
which is visually not perceptible, but also function as a direct contradiction of her 
husband’s judgement. Despite the fact that the main character still remains elusive, 
contradictory and ambiguous, the reader’s sympathy lies nonetheless with her, even 
though a conceptual understanding of her personality cannot be established through this 
narrative. The emotional connection is established through a dialectic of repulsion 
[Abstoßung] and attraction [Anziehung].35 This dynamic occurs in the first part of The 
Vegetarian. In this chapter, the protagonist is seen in a more preferable light due to the 
unpleasantness of the narrator/focalizor himself. The first part of the novel, also entitled 
“The Vegetarian,” is narrated by Yeong-Hye’s husband, Mr. Cheong, who turns out to 
be a disturbingly honest narrator. It will suffice to point out one sentence to make this 
dynamic visible. After describing how he raped his wife, the narrator calmly discloses: 
“After this first time, it was easier for me to do it again” (38). The narrator openly 
demonstrates this despicable behaviour without any sign of remorse and thus makes it 
(almost) impossible for the reader to identify with him. Even though there are only very 
few indicators that inform the reader about the protagonist’s personality, the crass focus 
on the husband inevitably compels the reader to align herself with the protagonist. This 
                                                 
35 The German terms offer a more precise description of this dynamic: Abstoßung (being pushed away 
from) & Anziehung (being pulled/drawn towards). Both terms combine the association of physical and 
emotional reaction with the reaction between two objects/elements.  
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disturbing honesty indirectly undermines the trustworthiness of the narrator’s judgment 
and of his interpretation of the situation. 
 But it is not only honesty that sabotages the authority of the narrator. When he 
announces: “This strange situation had nothing to do with me.” (26, see above) he is 
immediately contradicted by the following segment in italics, which functions as an 
expression of Yeong-hye’s interior monologue. As outlined above, this part of the 
narrative does suggest that part of her anger and aggressiveness is directed at him and 
exists because of him. This compromises not his ‘honesty’ as a narrator but his 
trustworthiness as interpreter of the situation. Similarly to the narrator/focalizor Daniel 
in Dujardin’s Les Lauriers, the text contradicts the narrator/focalizor, if not through 
external textual data, then through the intersection of his point of view with that of his 
wife. 
 Thus, the re-presentation of the protagonist in this chapter takes place on several 
levels. The most ‘immediate’ one is the interior monologue/dream-
sequences/memories, which are woven into the narrative and give the reader a 
momentary glimpse at the protagonist’s thoughts and feelings. The narrator’s 
unsympathetic and self-centred account of the events inclines the reader towards a 
compassionate connection with the protagonist, while the segments in italics 
consolidate this connection, since they confirm the reader’s suspicion about the 
narrator. This also emphasises the complicity between (implied) author and protagonist 
and shows how this complicitly has been cleverly constructed into a narrative that 
manoeuvres the reader into a sense of emphatic complicity with the protagonist. What 
is interesting about that (positive) ‘manipulation’ is that the novel manages to re-present 
complexity on different levels, thus allowing for a maintenance of this complexity. 
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 In my further analysis I will show how this different re-presentation functions 
in order to complicate our conceptions of communication, which helps reformulate the 
way we think about the way understanding works. In the first chapter there is no fruitful 
communication between narrator/focalizor and protagonist. But there is something 
similar to communication, which takes place between reader and protagonist and 
functions through the reader’s empathy for the protagonist and antipathy towards her 
husband. In contrast to this, the third chapter (“Flaming Trees”) is the only part of the 
novel where some kind of ‘real’ understanding takes place. Even though Yeong-hye 
does not speak at all, especially in the latter part of this chapter she has entirely seized 
to speak. This chapter reveals the most details about Yeong-hye’s childhood, but more 
importantly, it can be said to be about the bond of the two sisters,36 it shows their 
similarities and differences, but more importantly, a form of non-verbal communication 
between the sisters takes place. This communication works through In-hye’s 
identification with and speculation about her sister. It works – not because there is a 
verbal exchange of opinions but because In-hye attempts to understand, she draws 
parallels between her own life and her sister’s, she re-experiences the past, re-assigns 
meaning to that past. To take a closer look at how this form of communication and 
understanding works, I will explore the meaning of silence and/or the refusal to adhere 
to expected forms of communication in Schnitzler, Freud and Han. I will begin by 
drawing a connection between the (in-)ability of interpreting that silence and an 
analysis of how visual perception can misguide our interpretations. And lastly, I will 
                                                 
36 Kang said in an interview that the novel could be described as being about two sisters. 
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provide an interpretive analysis of “Flaming Trees” that suggests an alternative to 
phallogocentric37 conceptions of ‘understanding’. 
 
3.2 Whose Voice is it Anyway? 
3.2.1 Mental Health and the Fallacy of Visual Perception 
Jane Ussher argued, that there are certain epistemological assumptions at the root of all 
positivist-scientific thinking. I will only focus on one: the assumption of “realist logic” 
(209), meaning the idea that knowledge can only be gained through observation. This 
‘realist logic,’ in turn, relies on the assumption that “objects have real existence 
independent of any perceiver, knowledge system, or practice.” (ibid.). The problem that 
can arise from an analysis based on a specific, unquestioned, knowledge system is a 
serious one. If a subject observes someone behaving in a non-normative way and 
therefore describes that behaviour as indicating madness, this knowledge of the subject 
will stay embedded within that particular system of knowledge. Within this system, 
then, the presumptuous observation acquires the status of ‘objectivity’. However, this 
inherently means that the observing subject reflected neither on her own subject-
position nor on the question how the (e.g. socio-political) circumstances of that subject-
position might influence their definition of what constitutes non-normative behaviour. 
Ussher introduces this criticism in order to reassess how these assumptions can lead to 
a misinterpretation of mental illness because it ignores that “subjectivity, behavior, and 
the very meaning of ‘health’ and ‘illness’ are constructed within practice, language, 
relationships, and roles.” (216). Of course, this does not imply that biological factors 
                                                 
37 Another Derridian term that fits well is “carnophallogocentrism,” which describes how Western culture 
favours the consumption of meat over a vegetarian diet because meat is situated within society as an 
important symbol for masculinity and power and thus seen as irreplaceable (see Stobie, 788). 
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are irrelevant to mental health. Ussher’s criticism of realist logic shows that an 
assessment of mental health cannot be made from an objective point of view. 
 This can be further complicated when the question of knowledge production is 
formulated within an intercultural setting. As Oyèrónkẹ́ Oyèwùmí argues in her book 
The Invention of Women. Making an African Sense of Western Gender Discourses: “A 
concentration on vision as the primary mode of comprehending reality promotes what 
can be seen over that which is not apparent to the eye; it misses the other levels and the 
nuances of existence.” (14). For her, this explains the prevalence of the body in Western 
society, since “the world is primarily perceived by sight. […] The gaze is an invitation 
to differentiate.” (2). In Schnitzler’s novella the fallacy of visual perception is made 
explicit. As I have argued, the protagonist in Schnitzler’s novella is restricted by various 
social rules that dictate the behaviour of women and mainly chooses to follow the one 
option that at least allows her to publicly articulate the impossibility of her situation. 
This performative act is not pure rebellion and should not be romanticised. It is a 
desperate act of choosing the least terrible of options. What is interesting is that 
Schnitzler specifically placed the reader inside Else’s mind in order to validate her point 
of view. Furthermore, this performance takes place in plain view. Like a dramatic play, 
it involves and depends on the spectatorship of an audience. Thus Else makes the 
conflict she has to confront observable. However, making something observable does 
not mean that it will be interpreted correctly by the observing subject. The ‘realist 
logic,’ the logic that depends on the predominance of the visual and the body for 
knowledge production in Western discourses, is re-presented by the reaction of Paul 
and Else’s aunt. The people surrounding Else are incapable of understanding her action 
– maybe with the exception of Cissy (see above). This shows Schnitzler’s awareness of 
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the fallacy of visual observation and his emphasis that it does not hold the key to 
objective knowledge. 
 The Vegetarian functions in a similar way. I will here only describe how the 
fallacy of observation is treated in the first chapter. Relatively early on in the novel, Mr. 
Cheong makes an assessment of the mental state of his wife through observation: 
“[What] If the hints at hysteria, delusion, weak nerves and so on, that I thought I could 
detect in what she said, ended up leading to something more?” (25). Although the 
narrative is not very detailed, the reader learns enough about Yeong-hye’s behaviour. 
Yet, the ‘medical’ assessment of Yeong-hye’s husband is not only extremely vague, but 
simply misleading. “Hysteria,” for instance, is not even used in modern medical 
discourse anymore (see Concise Medical Dictionary, “Hysteria”). Today there is a 
distinction made between “Conversion Disorder” and “Dissociative Disorder”. 
Conversion Disorder is diagnosed with the following symptoms: “blindness, deafness, 
loss of sensation, gait abnormalities, false memory, or paralysis of various parts of the 
body.” (ibid., “Conversion Disorder”), while people diagnosed with Dissociative 
Disorder display symptoms like “loss of memory for important personal details 
(see amnesia), wandering away from home (see fugue), the assumption of a new 
identity, and trancelike states with severely reduced response to external stimuli.” (ibid., 
“Dissociative Disorder”). One could argue that Yeong-hye displays certainly one of the 
symptoms of the latter: ‘trancelike states’. However, it should be noted, that this type 
of behaviour is not new to her husband. When he recounts the night he had found her 
standing barefoot in the kitchen he compares “her complete lack of reaction” (15) with 
experiences of their past life together: “It was like those rare occasions when, absorbed 
in a late-night TV drama, she’d failed to notice me arriving home.” (ibid.).  
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 Instead of further discussing Yeong-hye’s mental health in medical terms, 
which is neither my profession nor my question of inquiry, I want to focus on the very 
nature of this observation. As mentioned above, Mr. Cheong’s description of Yeong-
hye’s symptoms is far from being thorough. In fact, he does not even state what specific 
types of behaviour he interprets as indicating ‘hysteria, delusion, weak nerves and so 
on’. Additionally, the narrator interprets the protagonist according to his standards of 
normative behaviour but is unwilling to have a conversation with his wife about the 
situation:  
“I never inquired as to the nature of this dream. I’d already had to listen once to that crazy spiel 
about the barn in the dark woods, the face reflected in the pool of blood and all the rest of it, and 
once had been more than enough. All because of this agonizing dream, from which I was shut out, 
had no way of knowing and moreover didn’t want to know, she continued wasting away.” (25, 
my emphasis underlined, italics in the original). 
What is so striking here is that while complaining about being ‘shut out,’ Mr. Cheong 
goes on to narrate that he ‘didn’t want to know’. Additionally, Mr. Cheong only begins 
to complain to a third party after his wife has ‘embarrassed’ him in front of his 
superiors. Before that, he did notice the change in Yeong-hye’s physique but he did not 
call his in-laws nor did he consult a doctor. When she first announces to him that she 
will not use any animal product for cooking anymore he is shocked and describes her 
as “self-centered” (21). Later on he describes how she “grew thinner by the day” (23) 
and began to resemble “a hospital patient” (ibid.), but this does not seem to trouble him 
much. He goes on declaring: “But what troubled me more was that she now seemed to 
be actively avoiding sex.” (24). This emphasises his lack of regard for Yeong-hye and 
shows that, in fact, as long as it does not concern him, he does not care at all. Thus, his 
description of her as ‘hysteric’ expresses more his own discontent with a wife who no 
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longer fulfils his commands and can thus be linked to a more general phenomenon of 
defining ‘defiant’ women as ‘mad’ or of otherwise excluding them from society. 
 This disregard is mirrored in his interpretation of Yeong-hye’s behaviour, which 
is rooted in misguided visual perception. Mr. Cheong perceives his wife as being calm 
and distanced without noticing the turmoil that takes place within her. This assessment 
of her disposition is based on visual perception alone. In a similar vein he denies the 
possibility of himself being part of the problem: “I resisted the temptation to indulge in 
introspection. This strange situation had nothing to do with me.” (26). This belief, 
again, is rooted in his subjective perception of their relationship as unproblematic. Since 
his wife never verbally expresses any kind of anger towards him, this possibility does 
not even exist for him. Interestingly, this very statement his directly contradicted in the 
segment in italics that follows it: “If you knew how hard I’ve always worked to keep my 
nerves in check.” (27). I will return to this segment later in relation to re-presentation 
and (un-)reliability. 
 This misguided perception is somewhat differently addressed in the second part 
“Mongolian Mark”. When Yeong-hye sees the naked body covered in flowers, for her, 
the body comes to simultaneously represent [vertreten] and re-present [darstellen] the 
flowers. She is sexually aroused by the flowers, not by the human body. This anticipates 
her desire to be a plant, which develops into the deep-rooted and genuine belief that she 
is really transforming into a plant, which is narrated in “Flaming Trees”. The painted 
body ceases to be a mere human body and instead figures as a human-plant hybrid and 
Yeong-hye envisions this hybridity as a cure for herself: “Will the dreams stop now?” 
(121) she asks after the sexual encounter with her borther in-law, who painted his body 
with flowers explicitly for that purpose. It is worth quoting her entire account of the 
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situation because it will help clarify the importance of this moment for her. When asked 
by her brother in-law about the faces she sees in her dreams she responds:  
“It’s different every time. Sometimes it feels very familiar, other times I’m sure I’ve never seen 
it before. There are times when it’s all bloody . . . and times when it looks like the face of a rotting 
corpse. […] I thought it was all because of eating meat […] I thought all I had to do was to stop 
eating meat and then the faces wouldn’t come back. But it didn’t work. […] And so . . . now I 
know. The face is inside my stomach. It rose up from inside my stomach. […] But I’m not scared 
anymore. There’s nothing to be scared of now.” (122).   
First of all, this is one of the rare instances, in which we are presented with her 
interpretation of her own situation, and it is the only situation, in which she actually 
explains her own feelings and thoughts. This scene also emphasises the huge impact 
that this visual illusion has on Yeong-hye. After this disclosure, the reader does not 
discover much about what happens between this scene and the last part of the book, 
which is set at a time when Yeong-hye has already been admitted to a psychiatric clinic. 
What we learn about the events in between is mainly what happened to her brother in-
law and how she got admitted to the clinic, however, there is no account of Yeong-
hye’s feelings or thoughts. Since there is no further mentioning of her nightmares, 
which are central elements of the first two chapters, it could be argued that this means 
that the dreams have stopped. Indeed, in “Flaming Trees” there is an account of only 
one dream of Yeong-hye – but the nature of this dream is altogether different from the 
nightmares that haunted her before. It is a dream where she experiences herself 
becoming a tree. In this dream she learns that the head of the tree is where its roots are. 
This metamorphosis into a tree in her dream takes over her life. She envisions herself 
as slowly turning into a tree, arguing that that is why she doesn’t need to eat anymore 
– she only needs sunlight and water (see 153f.). The remaining question, whose answer 
remains indefinite, is the following: Did the humanoid flower-sex cure that physical 
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pain in her chest? Did it stop her nightmares? In a way, it did. “Flaming Trees” is the 
only section of the book where the protagonist seems to be at peace. This peace is 
disturbed only by the medical staff enforcing a treatment on her that she is not willing 
to undergo. Despite this, it would be wrong to declare that it was the sex itself that 
‘cured’ her, and not only because that re-invokes older conceptions about hysteria and 
its cure.38 Rather, it seems that this becoming-plant (certainly in a more ‘real’ way than 
Deleuze and Guattari could have conceptualised) does not only happen on a visual 
plane, but, and even more so, on a psychological and even biological plane. The 
psychological plane means, of course, that Yeong-hye genuinly believes that she is as 
a matter of fact becoming a plant. The biological plane is intervowen closely with the 
psychological one in this case. Since she firmly believes that she does not need food 
anymore, she is physically incapable of eating without having to vomit as a direct 
reaction to the food. Obviously, she does not magically grow leaves, but she physically 
(and not merely ideologically) rejects food because her psychological and biological 
reaction to food have become inseparable.39 Here, again, mere visual perception of her 
body cannot explain the physical change that has taken place. Since the metamorphosis 
that she senses is occurring within her body, it is not perceptible to the eye.  
 Similarly, Else’s ‘paralysis’ is described as hysterical seizure by other 
characters. In the novella, the visual perception of the characters can only detect and 
interpret what they can observe: A young woman disrobing and collapsing in a room 
full of people. In contrast to the interior monologue, the reader experiences both, the 
                                                 
38 Doctors used to belief that the uterus was able to change its location within the body. According to 
them, if the uterus had wandered into the brain of a woman, that woman would become hysterical. The 
treatment proposed was basically that the woman needed an orgasm, which would re-locate the uterus 
where it belonged. 
39 This effect is similar to the effect of placebo, where the patient is healed not by medicine but by her 
own belief in the effect of medicine. This field of study is too complex to explore in this context. 
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visual perception and interpretation of the characters through Else’s perception and 
Else’s thoughts and feelings throughout the entire narrative. Thus, the ‘realist logic’ is 
dismantled as being misleading and incomplete. Instead, the narrative proposes that 
understanding of the ‘other’ works through identification and direct experience of the 
other’s thoughts and feelings. In interpretations of this novella, the misguided visual 
perception of the characters has been replicated. Thus, Else’s ‘paralysis’ has been read 
as “classical hysterical seizure, with katatonia and increased sensual awareness” 
(Schmid-Bortenschlager, 514), instead of seing it as a metaphor for her status in society 
(see above, p.46). Schmid-Bortenschlager at least admits that the interpretation of 
literary texts need not be exclusive or hierarchical but that literature allows for 
unresolved ambiguity (521), an ambiguity that she does not seem to see in Freud. 
However, it is only if we take Freud’s analysis for granted, that we assume that Freud’s 
interpretation is finite and exclusive. Indeed, Bruchstücke einer Hysterie-Analyse, 
leaves enough room to question Freud’s interpretation, let alone his methodology. In 
fact, many elements of Freud’s narration can be questioned – amongst the most telling, 
maybe his (mis)interpretation of Dora’s silence(s). Since there is no possibility for 
communication with Ida Bauer herself, the reader is left with a net of ambiguities. The 
interesting difference that Schmid-Bortenschlager notices between Freud and 
Schnitzler is that instead of only focussing on sexuality and the individual, Schnitzler 
does take social possibilities and the constructions of social roles into account, which 
can be seen clearly in Else’s awareness of the trade in women through marriage, which 
invokes Lévi-Strauss analysis of women as objects of exchange in patriarchal societies 
(see 518). Thus, Schnitzler accurately reflects the social intricacies that influence Else’s 
situatedness. How is the social reality of the lived lives of women in South Korea 
reflected in The Vegetarian? 
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 Since I am not a scholar of Korean culture and society, I will use a long segment 
from a study that analyses depression in married women in South Korea in order to 
describe the general social circumstances of women in Korea. The study is titled 
“Multiple Roles of Married Korean Women: Effect on Depression” and was written by 
Kwang Ja Lee, Chae Chung Um, and Susie Kim, all three of whom work at the College 
on Nursing Science at the Ewha Woman’s University in Seoul. Their text helps situate 
the social circumstances that are reflected in the novel: 
“Korean family life is generally based on Confucian philosophy and ethics that strongly influence 
the traditional values and roles of family members. Harmonious relationships among the family 
members are expected and strongly reinforced. Traditional values support the patriarchal system 
of roles and relationships in Korean families. The husband is expected to be the breadwinner, 
major decision maker, head of the family, and enforcer of rules. The wife’s role is to provide 
emotional nurturance to her husband and children and to assume full responsibility for the 
household tasks. She is expected to be passive and submissive to her husband and his family. 
When family members fail to perform the role behaviors demanded by tradition, disharmony and 
shame may be brought to the family, and women may be reprimanded by actual or threatened 
abandonment by the family (Ho, 1987). These traditional roles are challenged when Korean 
women work outside the home to assist in providing financial support and are also expected to 
perform numerous household and child-rearing tasks. Some women may cope with this challenge 
by negotiating with their husbands for assistance with household tasks and rearing children. 
Others may try to accomplish all of the expected tasks by working harder themselves.” (469f.) 
What this article shows (and which can be applied more broadly) is that the possibility 
to work has impacted women in often negative ways, since it was expected that they 
simply add their career on top of all the work they already have to do, instead of giving 
them the option to diminish their work on “traditional woman’s work.” The effect of 
this can be seen quite clearly in In-hye, who is not supported by her husband in any way 
and instead must accomplish the entirety of the household and child-rearing work plus 
86 
economic labour by herself. Even though the text does not examine Yeong-hye’s 
married life in detail, it becomes clear, that In-hye mirrors her younger sister and her 
behaviour in many ways. Both their husbands neither share their household work, nor 
provide emotional support. In-hye’s situation is intensified by the fact that she has a 
child she has to take care of, and is the sole breadwinner. Thus, she is ‘independent’ of 
her husband, since, in fact, he is superfluous concerning the maintenance of their 
household. Furthermore, due to his absence (physically and metaphorically) he does 
not seem to play an important role in her emotional life. This is reflected in the narrative 
itself, since the loss of her husband does not impact her life very much. In the third 
chapter, In-hye never remembers her husband except for in negative terms. She does 
not experience his absence as emotionally important, there is no mentioning of her 
missing him, instead, she is haunted by the fact that, even while they were still living 
together, he was already absent, even when he demanded physical attention, separated 
from her through his silence. This silence, however, functions very differently in 
comparison to Yeong-hye’s silence. His silence is also a communication strategy, but 
with the opposite goal: He does not want to communicate and rejects the possibility of 
forming a relationship with his wife based on mutual understanding. His silence 
functions similarly to Mr. Cheong’s silence, which is expressed in his refusal to engage 
in conversation with his wife about her dream. This type of silence functions as a barrier 
that is used as a strategy of exclusion. 
 The fact that only in the third chapter does the reader realise that In-hye’s 
situation might be similar to Yeong-hye’s stresses that visual perception and ‘objective’ 
interpretations are fallible, and asks: ´How does communication function? As could be 
seen in Freud’s communication with Ida Bauer, most communications depend on a 
hierarchical structure that designate one interlocutor as the determinant of what is 
87 
considered ‘rational,’ ‘true’ or ‘complete’. The husbands’ silences function in a similar 
way, for they operate as deteminants of the possibility of communication itself (which 
they negate). In the following section I want to explore the importance of silence as 
communication strategy from a different angle, explore how Yeong-hye’s silence 
functions differently and analyse what this novel can teach us about communication, 
and wheter this form of communication might shed light on a possibility of non-
hierarchical mutual understanding.  
3.2.2 Silence as Communication Strategy? 
George Steiner wrote in “The Hermeneutic Motion” that “all cognition is aggressive” 
(157). Steiners concept of ‘understanding’ is informed by Hegel and Heidegger, 
equating comprehension with appropriation (see ibid.). However, if any kind of 
understanding should be equally conceptualised as violent, appropriative act, then it 
certainly legitimises imperialistic violence against Others, since colonialism could 
accordingly be read as necessary for comprehension of and communication with other 
cultures. This view on the matter does not distinguish between an imperialist concept 
of understanding and a very different form of communication and understanding, 
namely one that is based on mutual respect and acceptance and thus refuses to 
acknowledge the difference between them. To acknowledge this difference, however, 
is important, especially because an imperialist notion of understanding does not allow 
for silence to be comprehended as communicative strategy and thus effaces silence 
from the discourse as inessential. This silence, so often misunderstood as non-
communication or refusal to communicate is actually an alternative form of 
communication, one that does not abide by the logical laws of ‘male,’ eurocentric, 
phallogocentric reason. Of course, it is important to give support to those who are 
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silenced and enable them to translate their silence into speech, but I think it is equally 
important to begin to understand their silence on their own terms. 
 Since silence can only be perceived as absence, it is easy to misread. Silence 
mingles with the question whether it is impossible to understand the Other. Thus, 
interpreting silence through observation alone turns out to be inadequate to accurately 
measure inner turmoil. This inadequacy of comprehension applies not only to the 
incapability of ‘natural’ human perception to comprehend the invisible expression of 
stress in other species, such as plants, whose stress-level can only be interpreted with 
the help of electronical measuring devices.40 Similarly, inner turmoil and stress are 
often invisible to the observer as could be clearly seen in Freud’s comprehension of 
Dora’s silence as acceptance of his interpretation. Else’s performative silence 
functioned similarly within society – as a mirror that reflected only what the perceivers 
wished to interpret. Her silence in the situation when she is harrassed by Dorsday and 
her sensation of being petrified is not recognised because Dorsday only perceives what 
he wishes to see. Furthermore, does her silence function as a platform for his speech 
that is directed at her, but also at himself. He needs this platform in order to establish 
the well-known narrative of the beautiful temptress that acquits him of any guilt and 
legitimates his demeanour (see above, p. 44). In a similar vain, Cissy envisions Else as 
a woman who is not ashamed and wishes the same for herself and Paul (see above, 
p.45f.). 
 Yeong-hye fulfils a comparable, albeit not analogous, function. She is described 
as ‘calm,’ ‘inattentive,’ with a ‘lack of reaction’ and throughout the entire novel 
                                                 
40 There’s a lot of research existing about this and the issue has even made it into newspaper articles, 
see e.g. “Dekorationswahn. Pflanzen sind keine Beistelltische” von Helmut Höge: 
http://www.taz.de/!5577867/, last accessed: 3/20/2019.  
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displays a very passive behaviour (except for those scenes in which she is confronted 
with physical violence).41 Similarly to Else, whatever interpretation is imposed on her 
from the outside merely reflects the interpreter. In “The Vegetarian” her husband relates 
the events of one evening when they had been invited to join his boss for dinner at an 
elegant restaurant. Upon discovering her vegetarianism, the conversation stays on that 
topic quite long, even though Yeong-hye herself does not say anything. Her husband 
even feels the need to invent a dietitian who had counseled his wife to follow a 
vegetarian diet. Here, Yeong-hye not only functions as a site of interpretation but also 
as a site of the signifier. It is clear from her husband’s behaviour that he sees himself as 
attached to her and knows that if she appears as a strange person in front of his boss, he 
will be linked to that image through mere association. This functions similarly to the 
female hostility in Fräulein Else. Even before leaving the house, Mr. Cheong had 
dragged her back inside the house and told her to put on more make-up because he 
didn’t not want to appear in public with his wife having a “sickly pallor” (28). As long 
as she stays inside the house and as long as her physical weakness cannot be linked to 
himself, he does not care.  
 The general conversation at that meeting centres around vegetarianism in a 
clearly condemning tone: “Meat eating is a fundamental human instinct, which means 
vegetarianism goes against human nature” (31); “I’d hate to share a meal with someone 
who considers eating meat repulsive, just because that’s how they themselves 
personally feel” (32). Even though Yeong-hye never expresses any such feelings, what 
the others perceive is what they expect to perceive – they expect Yeong-hye to perceive 
                                                 
41 According to Jina Kim, who spoke about the English translation by Deborah Smith at a Symposium 
on Translation presented at the University of Oregon in February 2019, the English translation actually 
renders the protagonist more active. This comparison to the Korean text enhances the importance of the 
protagonist’s passivity. 
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them with the same judgmental attitude with which they are observing her: “It seems 
to me that one shouldn’t be too narrow-minded when it comes to food.” (31). 
Obviously, this is a self-contradictory statement since it is made as a latent attack 
against another person who chose to live on an ‘unconventional’ diet. In a way that is 
not unsimilar to Freud, Yeong-hye’s silence, her wordless gaze, is considered to 
confirm their theories. But this silence is not a denial of communication. When asked, 
she does answer the question as to why she stopped eating meat. She tries to 
communicate to them, she wants to tell: “I had a dream” (31). Both, this form of silence 
and this form of communication, is starkly contrasted in the third chapter of the novel, 
“Flaming Trees”. 
 This last chapter is narrated by In-hye, Yeong-hye’s elder sister, and she is not 
only confronted with the inability to communicate with her sister, but also with the 
silence of her own husband: “Had she ever really understood her husband’s true nature, 
bound up as it was with that seemingly impenetrable silence?” (137). Here the 
husband’s silence clearly works as a refusal to communicate, which is fueled not only 
by neglect but also by disrespect.  
 In addition to the lack of communication between herself and her husband, In-
hye herself is unable to communicate with anyone about what is happening to her. This 
inability slowly starts dissolving itself when she tries to communicate with her sister. 
Her attempt at communication and understanding has nothing to do with the idea of 
imperialist appropriation as proposed by Steiner. Instead, she indulges in introspection. 
She remembers the beatings that her sister had to endure at the hand of their father, she 
repeatedly asks herself whether she did everything she could have done, but more than 
that, she tries to understand her sister – not in a rational manner, but through emotions 
and a sense of connection. However, this understanding does not magically happen, but 
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is the result of reflection and a lot of emotional labour. In the beginning she cannot 
comprehend her sister at all and thus fails to be able to communicate with her. After In-
hye promises to get her sister out of the clinic if she would only promise to eat, Yeong-
hye accuses her sister of being just like the doctors: “No one can understand me . . . the 
doctors, the nurses, they’re all the same . . . they don’t even try to understand . . . they 
just force me to take medication, and stab me with needles.” (162). Shortly after this 
scene, the narrator encloses In-hye’s own feeling and the way they might be related to 
her sister’s feelings:  
“This pain and insomnia that, unbeknownst to others, now has In-hye in its grip – might Yeong-
hye have passed through this same phase herself, a long time ago and more quickly than most 
people? Might Yeong-hye’s current condition be the natural progression from what her sister has 
recently been experiencing? Perhaps, at some point, Yeong-hye had simply let fall the slender 
thread that had kept her connected with everyday life.” (172, my emphasis). 
Not only does this imply that Yeong-hye’s reaction is ‘natural,’ but the narrator also 
begins to draw parallels between the two sisters. These questions are, of course, In-
hye’s, i.e. the focalizor’s, which is reflected shortly before when In-hye mutters to 
herself “Perhaps […] Perhaps it’s simpler than I thought. […] You’re crazy” (ibid.). 
The rapid change in her interpretation acknowledges the impossibility of monolithically 
determining the reason for Yeong-hye’s state of mind and, instead of enforcing a 
medical system or objective observational analysis, In-hye attempts to create 
understanding through emotional connection and compassion. But it also shows the 
difficulty of understanding someone else and that understanding needs to take place 
through a long process and not one singular (violent) action. But this text also teaches 
us that In-hye does not only begin to understand Yeong-hye, but through her desire to 
understand her sister she also begins to comprehend herself better. This is exemplified 
in the two male narrators in the novel. Both display such character traits as self-
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centredness and indifference towards others and thus can neither understand themselves 
nor others and thus are incapable of gaining knowledge about themselves or about 
others. This illustrates, yet again, the fallacy of the philosophical concept of the self as 
autonomous and independent of others.  
  
93 
IV. CONCLUSION 
“The subaltern cannot speak.”, this was Spivak’s verdict after the first verison of her 
essay Can the Subaltern speak? but in the revised version she came to reassess the 
question. Revisiting the case of Bhubaneswari42 she admits: “I was so unnerved by this 
failure of communication that, in the first version of this text, I wrote, in the accents of 
passionate lament: the subaltern cannot speak! It was an inadvisable remark.” (63). 
What is important here is that Spivak acknowledges that Bhubaneswari did, indeed, 
speak (although she argues that, being middle class, Bhubaneswari was not really a 
subaltern). She explicitly expressed through her own menstruation blood that she did 
not commit suicide because of an illegitimate pregnancy. What was so disturbing to 
Spivak is the silencing of that blood-voice not by the colonial empire, but by her own 
family who do not remember the real circumstances anymore and thus reestablish the 
prejudice of illegitimate pregnancy as reason for female suicide.  
 In my analysis of re-presentation I have not so much been interested in the 
subaltern as such, but in the figure of the oppressed woman who is denied the power of 
defining meaning, who is not mute but unheard, who is not inarticulate but uses a 
different type of expression, who is not speechless but simply misinterpreted. As Spivak 
correctly says, “All speaking, even seemingly the most immediate, entails a distanced 
decipherment by another, which is, at best, an interception43.” Whenever someone is 
communicating with me, I already receive a ‘coloured’ version of that communication. 
                                                 
42 Bhubaneswari Bhadu was a young woman who was fighting for Indian independence who committed 
suicide in North Calcutta in 1926. She was a distant relative of Spivak herself. Bhubaneswari waited for 
her period before killing herself so that it could not be interpreted as the reaction to an illicit pregnancy. 
However, decades later, other family members remembered Bhubaneswari’s suicide as “a case of illicit 
love” (63). 
43 This idea of espionage imagines something similar to what Rafael analyses in his text on translation: 
The interest in knowing what others say so that one can see through their secrects is one form of state 
espionage. 
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My understanding of that communication is always intrinsically intertwined with my 
own interpretation and thus the communication is ‘coloured’ with my interpretation. I 
do not agree with the idea that all understanding is necessarily violent (see George 
Steiner: “all cognition is aggressive”) because, firstly, this ‘colouring’ of the 
communication must not necessarily be inaccurate and, secondly, it does not need to be 
fueled by an aggressive energy but can instead be fueled by empathy. I propose to see 
this colouring as an alternative that does not lead into the idea of communication being 
necessarily and undeniably a violent, imperialist enterprise infused with the ‘male’ 
logic of conquering but as one that instead allows for a non-violent, non-imperialist 
concept of understanding and communication that acknowledges the complicity that 
can exist between two (or more) agents of communication. Instead of using the 
metaphor of ‘taking’ meaning out of some ill-defined void, I want to use the metaphor 
of giving one’s expression to someone else. Of course, this exchange of meaning does 
not necessary mean that the meaning received is the same as the meaning given but in 
co-mmunication there is always the possibility of asking questions and of rethinking 
one’s own judgements. 
 The consequence that I draw for theoretical and literary texts is that they might 
not be able to represent [vertreten] the subaltern or the oppressed, and they might not 
be able to ‘give voice’ to them, but what they do is that they re-present [darstellen], and 
through this depiction comes the possibility of communication. Even though Freud’s 
psychoanalytical assessment of Ida Bauer’s illness is very problematic, it could not 
conceal his own mechanics of interpretation. And his analysis has been recognised as 
biased and incomplete because of that. Thus, even though Freud tried to establish a 
sovereignty of interpretation for himself, and even though his interpretation is what he 
does manage to portray, the text has offered itself as a tool of indirect communication 
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with his patient. Schnitzler’s text works in a completely different way. By artificially 
eliminating the doctor’s perspective and creating a subjective narrative, the 
experiencing subject is disclosed as reliable focalizor. The simulated immediality 
allows for an artificial, almost direct, communication with the young woman, even 
though this re-presentation [darstellen] gets close to being a representation [vertreten], 
this representation is nonetheless nothing but a mere construction by the author. This 
construction, however, is, as I have shown, well thought through and powerfully crafted 
in such a way as to ‘manipulate’ the reader into an empathetic disposition towards the 
protagonist. What is important in this narrative is that Schnitzler did not obliterate the 
silence that Else endures but instead incorporates a discussion of the mechanisms of 
silencing in patriarchal discourse and society into his text. A similar voiceless void is 
beautifully arranged in Han’s novel where the protagonist’s silence is re-presented 
[darstellen] in order to emphasise the inaccessibility of that voice. The fact that this 
silence is contrasted with the active ‘male’ narrative, which is cleverly constructed in 
such a way as to undermine the validity of its own point of view, heightens the 
sensitivity of the reader and allows for a more nuanced representation [vertreten] of the 
silenced. This first chapter predisposes the reader towards a sympathetic engagement 
with Yeong-hye and her situation and this desire to understand is performed by In-hye 
in the last chapter through her recollection of the sister’s past together and through an 
account of her own experience. These experiences mirror Yeong-hye’s experiences in 
the first chapter (e.g. the recurring nightmares and the insomnia) but are now re-
pesented by the narrator from the experiencing subject’s point of view. Thus In-hye 
performs the function of the relative who listens to and comprehends the silent speech 
of the protagonist. similarly to Spivak who remembers the message of menstrual blood, 
In-hye remembers the message of recurring nightmares and insomnia. 
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APPENDIX: WHOSE VOICE IS IT ANYWAY – IN TRANSLATION? 
THE CONTROVERSY AROUND DEBORAH SMITH’S TRANSLATION OF THE VEGETARIAN 
 
Deborah Smith’s translation of Han Kang’s first novel The Vegetarian has been 
controversial. The book was first published in South Korea in 2007. The English 
translation, first published in 2015, was celebrated by English-speaking reviewers and 
severly criticised by South Korean media and scholars, most of which focused on 
textual mistranslations, arguing that this was due to Smith’s inaccurate knowledge of 
the Korean language, which she had, in fact, only started to learn roughly three years 
before she began to translate the novel. Unfortunately, I do not speak Korean myself 
and can therefore not independently judge this translation, just as I could not research 
what was said and written about the controversial translation in Korean. Therefore I 
will begin by outlining the controversy as reported in English-language media (UK and 
US), taking into account questions of (in-)accurate textual translation and stylistic 
differences. In this part, I will focus on articles written by Charse Yun, a Korean-
American scholar who teaches translation and writing at Ewha Womans University in 
Seoul. In reference to this particular case, the second part of this paper will be dedicated 
to a more general problem of translation, namely, that a text from a language (especially 
one that only very few people besides native speakers understand) depends on 
translation for it to be seen by others. Despite the inherent problem of translation, this 
is also absolutely necessary for ‘western’ ideas about literature, for the translation is the 
only way to engage with mutliple foreign literatures. Even polyglottism is not an answer 
because one person cannot possibly learn all existing languages. Thus, if one wishes to 
expand or change the literary canon to include more than Eurocentric literature, 
translations are indispensable. Thirdly, I will scrutinise the role that the practice of 
translation has and the premises that might impede certain texts from being translated 
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and the role the literary market plays in this. For this I will take a look at Tilted Axis 
Press, a new publishing press for translated texts founded by Debora Smith in 2015 and 
connect their agenda to other endeavours in feminist and postcolonial theory to engage 
in literature without blindly reinstating the hierarchy of the western canon and its 
definition of what counts as a masterpiece of literature. 
 
The Press-Controversy 
Deborah Smith’s translation of Han Kang’s first novel The Vegetarian has been very 
controversial, especially, since they won the Man Booker International Prize together, 
translator and writer. This is the first year the award has been given based on a single 
book instead of the entire body of work by an author and also the first time to be given 
to both translator and writer (see Man Booker Prize), and Boyd Tonkin, the chair of the 
panel of judges stated that the judges chose The Vegetarian “unanimously” (qtd. ibid.) 
as their winner because “Deborah Smith’s perfectly judged translation matches its 
uncanny blend of beauty and horror at every turn.’ (qtd. ibid.).   
Interestingly, it was only after Wook-Dong Kim44 and Charse Yun, both 
Korean-American scholars, introduced the Korean debate about the controversial 
reception of Smith’s translation to the english-speaking world that the problem of 
translation was more widely recognised. Before that, all but one reviewer of The 
Vegetarian wrote about the translation favourably, which is also an indicator that 
probably none of those reviewers actually knew Korean. The only negative review was 
written by Tim Parks who, when closely reading the text, notices some dissonances in 
                                                 
44 Unfortunately Wook-Dong Kim’s article was not available to me, but according to other newspapers’ 
reviews of this essay, he accused Smith of not knowing the Korean language sufficiently, especially of 
the sentence structure and claims that she is generally an inept translator (see Rosche). 
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the literary style, some words being very colloquial, while he considered that other 
words were to refined in order to be believably the narrator’s words (see Parks). His 
approach was the following: “I must consider the relationship between content and style 
in the English translation. In a literary text a certain content manifests itself in a certain 
style. There is no separating the two.” (ibid.). He does not explicate in any way why he 
thinks that content and style cannot be separated, and while it is true, that content is a 
part of the style and the style part of the content, it does not necessarily imply that 
content and style need be coherent. The writer as a creative artist can do whatever she 
wants, including writing the narrator’s use of words incoherently. This incoherence 
could also signify the colouring of the narrative by the focalizor or the implied author. 
Furthermore, he is talking about a translation. Maybe this disparity is meant to make 
the foreignness of the text visible? But let’s turn to an analyst who does speak Korean, 
for otherwise the analysis will be no more than an analysis of the translation itself, 
independently of the Korean novel itself. 
As Charse Yun, a Korean-American, explains in his article in the Korea Exposé, 
shortly after Smith and Han won the Man Booker International prize “Korean-language 
media began to report numerous mistranslations” and it soon became a very 
controversial debate, and not only due to ‘mistranslations’. Yun cross-read the English 
translation and the Korean novel and said that “Smith occasionally confuses the 
subjects of sentences. In several scenes, she mistakenly attributes dialogue and actions 
to the wrong characters, as in one bizarre exchange where the brother-in-law ends up 
referring to himself in the third person” (LA-Times), adding that a research paper 
presented at Ewha Womans University in 2016 showed that 10.9% of the first part of 
the novel was mistranslated while 5.7% of the Korean text had been omitted (Korea 
Exposé). There can be no doubt that this is problematic. 
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There is another question that is very important to analyse besides the question 
of the translation of the language itself, namely whether the tranlsation of the culture 
and its mentality is present in the translated text. How did the translation introduce 
Korean culture to the English-speaking world? Was the Korean culture inherent in the 
text mistranslated? What importance does a difference in style of writing have? As far 
as english-language newspapers go, Yun provides the most elaborate analysis that takes 
these issues into account. The only other article focusing on this question is one by 
Jianyang Fan, a reporter for The New Yorker. Hhowever, much of her analysis of the 
controversy surrounding Smith’s translation is based on Yun’s texts, which is why I 
will not take her article into account.  
Yun not only criticises Smith’s knowledge of Korean but also more generally 
the style of her writing, the rhythm of the sentences. He writes that “Smith amplifies 
Han’s spare, quiet style and embellishes it with adverbs, superlatives and other 
emphatic word choices that are nowhere in the original,” emphasising that “This doesn’t 
just happen once or twice, but on virtually every other page.” (LA-Times). 
Interestingly, this does not deter him from his admiration of the translation because, 
according to him, it managed to give attention to Korean literature and helped introduce 
Han Kang to the english-speaking world (see ibid.). Yun brings up another point in his 
assessment of the translation: The question of the accurateness of the translation is 
‘moot’. Interestingly, ‘moot’ has two quite different meanings: ‘irrelevant’ or 
‘questionable’ (See Oxford Online Dictionary). The question is irrelevant because most 
of the translation’s readers will never be able to compare the text to the Korean novel 
itself, and undecidable, because it is a complicated academic question that oscillates 
between mistrust of the translation due to its inaccurateness, and admiration of the 
translation for its power to popularise Korean literature as a whole. Whether accurate 
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or not, the translation sparked interest in many people, Korean literature has become 
more popular and a “highly respected South Korean writer [has been introduced] to 
much-deserved recognition abroad” (ibid.).  
This ambivalency towards the translation can also be seen elsewhere: Jeong 
Gwa-ri, professor of Korean Language and Literature at Yonsei University, argued that 
“Smith added emotional adverbs in descriptions and amplified the emotional context 
by making something ordinary more special” (qtd. by Yung Suh-young). Although he 
saw the popularity of The Vegetarian as important for the “future of Korean literature” 
and as an “opportunity to introduce the value of Korean literature overseas” (qtd. ibid.), 
he stressed that it is important to question “whether transformation of the original text 
is rightful” (qtd. ibid.). This very ambivalence seems to be widely spread in the study 
of translations in general and points to the highly political engagement of translation 
theory, which allows us to question how the politics of the speaking voice in translation 
works. Who is speaking for whom, and why, and what does all that matter? 
 
Philosophies of Translation and their Politics 
For the past centuries, most debates about translations have centered around the 
dichotomous opposition of fidelity vs. freedom. In more recent texts about translation 
this opposition has been renamed and become a debate about foreignisation and 
domestication. I will not further elaborate on the conceptions of these notions by 
different theorists, for I am not interested in the definitions of these terms but in their 
appearance as dichotomies in theories. As Lori Chamberlain has pointed out, this 
dichotomous distinction is based on misogynous metaphors and endowed with a 
colonial attitude. In her account of the fidelity/freedom-debate she argues that idealised 
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images of the female have been used in order to validate the positive or negative 
assessments of ‘faithful’ or ‘unfaithful’ tranlsations, which are intertwined with the 
cultural evaluations of what is defined as ‘productive’ and what as ‘reproductive’ work. 
An example that can make the fallacy of gendered metaphors in this distinction visible 
is the case of Clara Schumann. She herself was a virtuous pianist, but also a creative 
composer. However, after her marriage she focused her creative work on editing her 
husband’s compositions (see Chamberlain, 254). Even more striking is that her own 
compositions were invalidated due to her being a woman artist45 and she was only fully 
acknowledged as a composer in her own right in 1990 (Schumann-Portal). For a long 
time, she was not acknowledged as a ‘productive’ artist, but was seen as a 
‘reproductive’ pianist. Even this ‘reproductive’ work was not recognised as an 
independent interpretation of the work of art. Thus, the virtuous pianist might be 
compared to the tranlsator, for both always offer an interpretation of the ‘original,’ 
thereby changing it’s form of expression. This form of interpretation, as Chamberlain 
shows, has been gendered as ‘female’:  
“The sexualisation of translation appears perhaps most familiarly in the tag les belles infidèles – 
like women, the adage goes, translations should be either beautiful or faithful. […] For les belles 
infidèles, fidelity is defined by an implicit contract between translation (as woman) and original 
(as husband, father, or author). However, the infamous ‘double standard’ operates here as it might 
have in traditional marriages: the ‘unfaithful’ wife/translation is publicly tried for crimes the 
husband/original is by law incapable of committing. This contract, in short, makes it impossible 
for the original to be guilty of infidelity. Such an attitude betrays real anxiety about the problem 
of paternity and translation. (255). 
                                                 
45 If Wikipedia is to be believed, this is what one commentator, Hans von Bülow, wrote about Clara 
Schumann’s compositions: „Reproductives Genie kann dem schönen Geschlecht zugesprochen werden, 
wie productives ihm unbedingt abzuerkennen ist … Eine Componistin wird es niemals geben, nur etwa 
eine verdruckte Copistin … Ich glaube nicht an das Femininum des Begriffes: Schöpfer. In den Tod 
verhaßt ist mir ferner alles, was nach Frauenemancipation schmeckt.“ (my emphasis). Unfortunately, in 
the short time I had to research this, I could not find out where this quote originally was taken from.  
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Here, woman figures as the beautiful, alas ‘unfaithful’. Chamberlain exposes, how our 
preconceptions of gender influence the evaluation of translation. The author is by 
default the ‘male’ who needs to insure that his patrilineal kinship is guaranteed. It is the 
beautiful woman that embodies unfaithfulness, for unfaithfulness of the male is 
inconsistent with the construction of maleness itself, adultery being defined as 
something that only women can commit. In a similar vain, when concerned with the 
source-text languge, it is the ‘mother-tongue’ who’s chastity needs to be preserved (see 
255f.), thereby insuring the patrilineal heritage of the ‘original’ (see 255). Thus, the 
anxiety about les belles infidèles becomes clear as an anxiety about patrilineal descent, 
evoked even in the grammatical complicity of the feminine plural of les belles infidèles 
with la traduction. Since the name for the translators could have been les beaux 
infidèles, concurring with the idea of the male tranlator, le traducteur, the gendering 
involved in defining the status of tranlsations is plainly visible. 
 Simultaneously to the gendering of metaphors of translation, Chamberlain 
(although her main focus remains the aspect of gender) also establishes a link between 
colonialism and the practice of translation. She argues that “translation has also been 
figured as the literary equivalent of colonization, a means of enriching both the 
language and the literature appropriate to the political needs of expanding nations.” 
(258). Thus, colonisation means not only the appropriation of valuable resources and 
cheap human labour, but also the appropriation of other cultures, elements of their 
languages and literatures (including oral tradition), music and other forms of art. 
Contrarily to the honest endeavour of trying to learn from other cultures (which should 
not be villainised), cultural appropriation describes the practice of forcefully taking 
what one wants without any concerns for the source languages and literatures and their 
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people, including taking only what reflects and thereby confirms one’s own stereotypes 
about the other culture. 
 Vincente L. Rafael argued that translation and language learning can be seen as 
‘war-fighting skills’ (see 452), paralleling Chamberlain’s claim that “literary success is 
equated with military success” (258). Rafael analysises a speech given by  George W. 
Bush in 2006, in which Bush promised more funding for “the teaching of so-called 
‘critical languages’ such as Arabic, Farsi, Chinese” (451), situating this political 
strategy within the history of empires. Rafael convincingly explains how language 
features as an elemental tool for colonisation strategies. Learning languages and 
translation is, in this context, rendered into an activity that can be “weaponized for the 
sake of projecting American power abroad while insuring security at home” (453). 
Foreign languages and the study of other cultures thus become means for espionage and 
exploitation. As Rafael argues, this conception of translation is closely link to the 
ideological implications inherent in perceiving the language of others as less valid or 
less valuable than one’s own: “Rather than an alternative, the native language [meaning 
the languages of Native Americans] is regarded like any other foreign language: as an 
instrument for consolidating the dominant place of English.” (457). But if languages 
and translations can be weaponised, and if the dichotomies of fidelity/freedom and 
foreignisation/domestication are inherently inscribed with gendered metaphors and 
colonialist concepts, how can we circumnavigate these problems in translations?  
 Lawrence Venuti famously argued that the work of the translator should be 
made visible, so maybe we can find an alternative if we start to consciously ‘see’ the 
practice of translation. Venuti also reflects on the social and political circumstances of 
translation. He understands the translator “as co-producer of a text” (Emmerich, 200). 
Thus, a translation cannot be understood as a text manufactured by an individual 
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independent of the social structures that surround her, but as a co-production between 
text, translator and “prevailing practices of marketing, reading and evaluating 
translations” (ibid.). Thus, the publishing industry has a mayor impact on how 
translations are being done, for they are the ones reading the translations, editing, 
suggesting stylistic changes etc. and therefore have a huge impact on how translators 
do their work. The publishing houses, in return, are influenced by the capitalist demand 
that texts be ‘consumable’ (see Venuti, 187), meaning, easy to read, quick to read, so 
that books can be consumed at high speed. Venuti argues that “this translation strategy 
has a certain relation to bourgeois economic values: the less awkward, unidiomatic and 
ambiguous a translation is made, the more readable it is, and hence the more 
‘consumable’ it becomes as a commodity on the book market.” (ibid.). Thus bourgeois 
values merge with the spirit of capitalism46: the subject is an autonomous individual, 
“free and equal”. There are two premisses that Venuti explores when he talks about 
“fluency in translation” (ibid.).  
Firstly, fluency is linked to the idea of transparency, meaning, the upholding of 
the illusion that the author’s style,  personality and intention or meaning is represented 
(see ibid.). This transparency is the invisibility of the translator, for it obscures the fact, 
that the work of translation is a decision-making process where the translator’s active 
work consists of choosing from different possible options. This decision process is far 
from innocent because the translator cannot translate without having interpreted the 
text, which is why the translation will always be influenced by the translator’s personal 
                                                 
46 “Ein wichtiges Element für eine Netzwerkgesellschaft ist, dass die einzelnen Teilnehmer bestimmte 
Qualitäten haben müssen, um darin erfolgreich zu sein, wie z.B. Flexibilität, Verfügbarkeit, Mobilität 
und persönliches Engagement.“ (my paper for Sonja’s Theatre course Fall 2018; the network society in 
Chiapello/Boltanski’s Le Nouvel Esprit du Capitalisme [1999] is the new spirit of capitalism. One 
essential quality of a successful person in this form of society is the autonomous, independent subject 
who is not bound by any ties. Unfortunately I cannot discuss this here in more detail. 
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interpretations. Venuti links this transparency also to the readability, i.e. easy 
accessibility, of the text. 
Secondly, Venuti links the question of fluency to the conception of the human 
subject as “a free, unified consciousness that transcends the limitations posed by 
language, biography, and history and is the origin of meaning, knowledge and action.” 
(187f.). He argues that it is necessary to decenter this conception of the transcendental 
subject and quotes Barthes’ definition of a ‘text’ in The Death of the Author as “a tissue 
of quotations drawn form the innumerable centers of culture” (197). This opposition to 
the idea of the transcendental subject and to the idea that a text presents the reader with 
the author’s expression of “himself or [of] a personal truth” (ibid.) can also be used for 
the practice of translation, for it exposes both author and translator to be not the 
independent, autonomous individual composing the text, but conceptualises them as 
imbedded in a very specific environment and therefore (unconsciously) influenced by 
it, meaning that they “bring with them a set of ideological determinations” (197). Thus, 
what seems to be the author’s or the translator’s choices of phrasing are not only 
determined by personal taste and style, but also by “the social context in which they are 
made” (see ibid.). However, Venuti is not as radical as Barthes in his wish to relieve 
the author of her authority, as can be seen in his argument that translation is always a 
‘decision process’ (see his discussion of Jirí Levý, 182). No two translators produce the 
same tranlsation, and similarly, no two authors produce the same text. Thus, Venuti’s 
text dismantles the dichotomy of the author’s agency vs. the death of the author and the 
text as a mere tissue of quotes as not necessarily contradictory, especially when he 
explicitly stresses that “By insisting on larger, cultural determinations I do not mean to 
exclude the question of intentionality; my discussion does in fact incorporate Grave’s 
[i.e. the translator’s] own record of his intention, his preface.” (192). 
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In a similar way, Venuti argues against the dichotomy of fluency vs. fidelity, by 
giving two examples and explaining that there are different types of fluency that can be 
translated. His first example is the translation of Suetonius’s The Twelve Caesars by 
the British poet and translator Robert Graves. Graves translation is very readable 
(fluency) and even translates cultural items, such as monetary systems and cities from 
the Latin sesterces to gold pieces, from antique names of cities to their modern 
equivalents, “whenever they are more familiar to the common reader than the classical 
ones” (qtd. ibid. 191). Instead of invalidating Graves translation, Venuti explains how 
this specific translation was done in light of historical circumstances. Since the British 
population was not well acquainted with Latin culture and literature, Graves chose to 
accommodate them and render the foreign text in such a way as to make it accessible 
to them, so that they could begin to learn about it (see 191).  
Furthermore, for Venuti, there is a second layer that needs to be taken into 
account: Suetonius’s text displays the historical figure, Ceasar, not as a coherent entity, 
thus contradicting the bourgeois ideology of the transcendental subject inherent in the 
fluency of the text itself. The unerlying content that “does not offer a coherent position 
of subjectivity for the reader” (193) is seemingly overwritten by the bourgeois ideology 
of fluency, whilst simultaneously being reinstated by the very transparency of that 
fluency that shows the incoherence of Caesar’s actions – and therefore negates the 
bourgeois assumption of the subject as transcendental entity. 
The second example Venuti chose in order to articulate his differentiated 
conception of fluency is Ezra Pound’s translation of the Anglo-Saxon The Seafarer. 
Venuti describes Pound’s translation strategy as ‘resistance’ (see 194), meaning that he 
uses archaic words and imitates “compound words, alliteration, and accentual meter of 
Anglo-Saxon poetry.” (ibid.) This, however, renders the text into poetry that is not very 
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easily accessible or understandable, due to the “elliptical, discontinuous poetry, in 
which transparency is rejected and the subject (of the enunciation as well as of the 
enounced) is dislocated.” (ibid.). Thus, the stlye contradicts the bourgeois ideology of 
the transcendental subject. As Venuti argues, the translation has nontheless also an 
element of fluency. In the Anglo-Saxon text, the protagonist is not a coherent subject. 
Instead there is “an intriguing discrepancy between the seafarer’s obsessive desire to 
maintain his hard life at sea, […] and his Christian belief in an afterlife of spiritual 
rewards and punishments” (ibid.). However, “Pound’s translation heals this split and 
recuperates the transcendental subject: it omits the Christian references entirely” 
(195),47 which reinstates the notion of a transcendental subject, while the source-text 
features opposing concepts of the subject, one individualistic, the other collective (see 
ibid.). If we consider Venuti’s early text in this way, we can already see impulses 
towards the changes he later made in his theory. As Karen R. Emmerich points out, 
Venuti’s thinking turned towards a ‘stylistic analogue’ (see 202). This stream of thought 
can already be seen in his critical approach to the concept of fluency as outlined above. 
Thus he dismantles the dichotomy of ‘foreignising’ and ‘domesticating’ and instead 
draws attention towards the fact, that both can take place on at least two levels of the 
translation, content and style.  
As Antoine Berman has shown in Translation and the Trials of the Foreign, one 
important element when translating novels is the rhythm of the novel, meaning, the 
narrative flow, this ‘rhythmic movement’ as Berman called it. In this strain of thought, 
he argues that “it is fortunately difficult for translation to destroy this rhythmic 
                                                 
47 As Venuit mentions, it might be that earlier versions of the poem did not reference Christianism. The 
Christian ideology might have been added in ‘monastic transcriptions’ (see 194). But even if the Christian 
references were added by monks, there could have been a split in the subject in earlier versions that 
refered to something other than Christianity. 
109 
movement,” but it can “considerably affect the rhythm” (248), which seems to be what, 
for instance, Yun criticised about Smith’s translation. Another point that Berman 
discusses, is that the translation can destroy the “underlying networks of signification” 
(248). These two elements point towards Venuti’s discussion of fluency and how these 
‘underlying networks of signification’ (i.e. the subject not seen as transcendental entity) 
can be made visible through a linguistically fluent translation and obscured by a 
linguistically decentered translation (see above). These conceptions are similar to what 
Gayatri Spivak calls ‘rhetoricity of language,’ which works differently in every 
language and is thus very difficult to translate. She insists, that a translation needs to 
pay much attention to this rhetoricity in the source-text language if it wants to evade 
the trap of a ‘neocolonialist construction of the non-Western scene” (181).  
 What is interesting about this is that although Smith’s translation has re-shaped 
the language from it’s ‘quiet style’ and has ‘embellishe[d] it with adverbs, superlatives 
and other emphatic word choices’ (Yun qtd. above), when reading the novel, the 
protagonist’s quiet style of  existence was transmitted. In an interview, the author, Han 
Kang, said about her main character, that “ironically the protagonist, Yeong-hye, 
doesn’t have a voice. She’s a silent character that is observed, desired, misunderstood, 
and pitied, and for precisely those reasons I took great care when writing her.” 
(interview, 6:51-7:12 – transcribed English subtitles). This idea about a silent 
resistance, a resistance that is non-violent and does not speak is contrary to a Western 
understanding of resistance, where it is conceptualised in more violent terms. This quiet 
resistance seems to be embedded in South Korean culture, made visible by the 
“candlelight revolution” (Han, NY Times) in the Winter of 2016/17: “Every Saturday, 
in cities across South Korea, hundreds of thousands of citizens gathered and sang 
together in protest against the corrupt government, holding candles in paper cups, 
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shouting that the president should step down.” (ibid.). But there seems to be more to 
this concept of a peaceful revolution. Han explains that when South Koreans seem 
‘calm’ in the face of the possibility of war with North Korea, this might only be seen 
on the surface: “And yet, does this calm prove that South Koreans really are as 
indifferent as we might seem? Has everyone really managed to transcend the fear of 
war? No, it is not so.” (ibid.) She goes on to explain why, for South Koreans, war with 
North Korea can never be a solution: They still feel the artificial devision of people who 
are the same people.  
“One reason, even in these extreme circumstances, South Koreans are struggling to maintain a 
careful calm and equilibrium is that we feel more concretely than the rest of the world the 
existence of North Korea, too. Because we naturally distinguish between dictatorships and those 
who suffer under them, we try to respond to circumstances holistically, going beyond the 
dichotomy of good and evil. For whose sake is war waged? This type of longstanding question is 
staring us straight in the face right now, as a vividly felt actuality.” (ibid.). 
 
This rejection of violence and war can be felt in The Vegetarian, even though the 
English language itself might not reflect that. The protagonist is portrayed as elusive. 
She does not have a voice of her own in the text, which is narrated by three different 
narrators: her husband, the husband of her sister and her sister. We glimpse at the 
protagonist through the other characters’ description of her. There are only a few lines 
in italics in the first part of the novel that seem to be the protagonists stream of thought. 
Other than that, there is no psychologically comprehensible description of the character, 
which, to me, seems to be quite contrary to westernised concepts of character 
description in literature, where it seems to be the belief that one can sympathise best 
with characters who’s actions have been explain, who’s mind has been psychologically 
made interpretable.  
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 Independently of whether my assessment of this cultural element of peaceful 
resistance and the elusiveness of the character in contrast to western ideas about 
literature is adequate or not, there is another element that needs to be taken into account. 
Smith’s translation was not created in a void but was influenced by editors the 
publisher. Therefore, the translation cannot only be said to have been influenced by 
Smith’s decisions of how to translate, but also by the demands of the publishing 
industry. Smith herself recounts her experience with publishing houses:  
“I was getting enough of an insider’s view of the publishing industry to be aware of all the implicit 
biases that made it so difficult for these books to ever get published, especially if they weren’t 
from European languages (harder to discover, editors can’t read the original, lack of funding 
programmes, authors who don’t speak English). Plus, publishing’s inherent conservatism means 
that what little did get through was weighted towards the commercial end of the scale, which is 
not the kind of writing that excites me.” (qtd. by Abrams). 
 
Here, the problems within the publishing houses are made explicit and point to another 
problem that needs to be discussed when talking about translations: Who gets to decide 
who is published in translation? Who is editing these translations? What ideas about 
how literature should look like influence the ways translators can work? And, is there 
any way to counteract this? 
 
Counter-Publishing? 
For Deborah Smith herself the question of translation is a political choice. In her “not-
for-profit press” (‘About Tilted Axis Press’) Tilted Axis, which she founded in 2015, 
they are determined to publish English translations of texts from other languages and 
cultures that are not very well known in the English-speaking world, and thus have no 
voice in the Western construction and interpretation of the world. She stated, “we 
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publish exclusively fiction that is translated from an Asian language, contemporary, 
and innovative. In other words, the kind of books that might not otherwise make it into 
English, for the very reasons that make them exciting to us.” (qtd. in Abrams). 
Obviously, there is a problem inherent in this statement. The publishing press selects 
the books they will publish themselves, they don’t take submissions (see ibid.) and this 
selection seems to be based on an interest in another culture’s literature that is defined 
by what ‘we’ as Westernes find interesting. But the issue is more complex. Tilted Axis 
Press has presented itself as feminist, but by acknowledging the plural in the noun 
‘feminisms’. On their website they argue: 
“For us, feminist publishing means working against the fetishisation of ‘oppression’, and demands 
that authors explicitly subscribe to what white women recognise as feminism, or even foreground 
their femaleness in their work. Working towards ensuring the women we publish have the creative 
agency to contextualise their work, resisting the commodification, fetishisation and/or erasure of 
their femaleness on their own terms.” (‘Translating Feminisms’). 
 
But the project is also invested in decolonisation: “As part of Tilted Axis’s wider project 
of decolonisation through & of translation, and in response to seeing WoC author’s 
work misread through a white feminist lens, we wanted to re-imagine the possibilities 
of a fully intersectional international feminism.” (ibid.). This agenda is also evident in 
the diversity of the main staff (see pictures at ’Who we are’). By revealing their 
intentions and reasons they disclose their agenda, but also themselves. In politics as in 
literature it is important to know who has the power to speak, for it determines who gets 
to decide who’s voices are being heard, and how these voices are being translated. As 
Foucault argued in Qu’est-ce qu’un auteur?, it does matter “How, under what 
conditions, and in what forms […] something like a subject [can] appear in the order of 
discourse,” and that it also matters to analyse how these conditions dictate “What place 
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[this subject can] occupy in each type of discourse, what functions [it] can assume, by 
obeying what rules” (221). Here, Foucault talks about the author of a (literary) text, but 
this also encapsules a very relevant question in Translation Theory. As Yun stressed, 
the reader of the translation is most likely to not know the source language and is thus 
incapable of comparing the translation to the source-text, hence the importance of 
asking who is not being translated and why? As Jeong lamented, Korean literature has 
not been the focus of Westerner’s attention regarding world literature, and only two 
novels, Shin Kyung-sook's Please Look after Mom and Han Kang’s The Vegetarian, 
have been popular ‘overseas’ (see Jeong, qtd. by Yun). A similar concern seems to be 
the fueling energy for Tilted Axis Press, Smith stating that their main focus is “to 
publish under-represented writing, which is an intersection of original language, style, 
content, and often its author’s gender. To publish it properly, in a way that makes it 
clear that this is art, not anthropology.” (qtd. by Abrams). This focus on the artistic 
dimension in translation is obviously important when translating literary texts, for the 
artistic creation in the source language is what we admire in literature. Thus, while 
content and style certainly can be contradictory, they cannot be clearly separated 
because the style of writing is part of the content, and vice versa. In writing her defence 
of Smith’s translation, Claire Armitstead argued that one of the main reasons why 
Korean literature is so little known is because English was the translators’ second 
language and thus they “throttled the literary life out of it, preventing sophisticated and 
important writers such as Hwang Sok-Yong or Yi Mun-Yol from taking their rightful 
place on the world stage” (Armitstead). Armitstead shows another important problem 
for translation theory. Not only can a foreign text be mistranslated or altered in the 
process but, and in a way this is even more essential, the foreign language text needs a 
translation if it wants to be recognised in the english-speaking world. Since 1985 it has 
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been a concern in western feminist theory to evade ethnocentricity and not only talk 
about white feminism and white women’s literature, but to incorporate the writings and 
points of view of women of colour. As Elizabeth Abel emphasises in her article “Black 
Writing, White Reading” (1993), around 1985 the new attention to texts by women of 
colour had several reasons, one of which was “the sheer brilliance and power of this 
writing and its escalating status in the literary marketplace and, consequently, the 
academy” (831). As can be seen, the emergence of new literature is able to influence 
the academic discussion of feminism. It was important for the development of 
intersectional feminism, as proposed by Kimberlé Crenshaw in 1991, to first 
incorporate non-white women’s perspectives into academic discussions of feminism, 
and similarly, literary texts from other ethnicities/cultures will first need to be seen on 
the western/english-speaking ‘literary marketplace’ in order to make our own biases 
visible to us. Obviously, this is not the task of non-european writers but of 
European/Western publishing houses. The task for us is to create a platform where these 
texts can be published in their own right as great literature. In the case of Asia, most 
national literatures have been outshadowed by the presence of Chinese and Japense 
literature, thus making it more difficult for Korean literature to be acknowledged on the 
popular book marked (see Yun qtd. by Fan). In this light, the agenda of Tilted Axis 
Press is quite clearly one that wants to overcome this problem by focusing on publishing 
texts from languages and cultures that are not commonly seen on the literary market. 
The importance of translation is eminent in writings of women of colour and in texts 
from overshadowed literatures. Many people of colour from the U.S. or from countries 
of the African continent have chosen to publish their work in English or in French, 
depending on their country of origin and that countries history of being colonised. This 
however, has taken the focus away from other African languages and their literatures, 
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for it is much easier and more comfortable for the eurocentric literary market to publish 
these books in their own languages, be it French or English, for there is a ready Western 
audience for these languages. Most writers from Asian countries don’t even have that 
option and translation will be the only way for them to present their literary works to 
the world. But translation is not only important for under-evaluated literatures but can 
also help to undermine our notions of canonicity.  
This canon however is defined to a high degree by academia itself, and 
consequently, their ideas about what should be defined as literature and what should be 
read also influences what is being taught. What Venuti fails to mention when he writes 
about fluency is that it is precisely the academic elite, the elite that already speaks that 
foreign language, or, the academic elite of that foreign language, that criticises 
translations that make the content accessible to those who have not learned the foreign 
language but are interested in reading foreign literature. Furthermore, providing 
translations that the readers enjoy might inspire them to learn more about that particular 
culture, that particular writer, or they might even think about learning that language. 
And this is why, adding to the intersections of feminist analysis and postcolonial theory, 
we need to take social class and the fallacies of elitism into account. 
 
Conclusion 
Of course, when reading and talking/writing about translations it is necessary to engage 
with a critique of the translator’s method of translation. And it is also important to learn 
about the other language and culture. But by counteracting colonialist and sexist 
metaphors that determine the value of a specific archetype of translation we can re-
evaluate translations and make them more visible as translations. To change the 
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publishing industry as a whole might be a utopian project but, as The Vegetarian 
exemplified, the popular translation of one novel has the power to influence what the 
readers are interested in and how they think about other cultures and literatures. 
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